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Micro-level survey data are widely used in applied economic research. This
dissertation, which consists of three empirical papers, demonstrates challenges in
empirical research using micro-level survey data, as well as some methods to
accommodate these problems.
Chapter II examines the effect of China's recent public health insurance reform
on health utilization and health status. Chinese policy makers have been eager to
identify how this reform, characterized by a substantial increase in out-of-pocket costs,
has affected health care demand and health status. However, due to self-selection of
individuals into the publicly insured group, the impact of the reform remains an
unresolved issue. I employ a Heckman selection model in the context of difference-in-
difference regression to accommodate the selection problem, and provide the first solid
IV
empirical evidence that the recent public health insurance reforms in China adversely
affected both health care access and health status for publicly insured individuals.
Chapter III examines the construct validity of a stated preference (SP) survey
concerning climate change policy. Due to the fact that the SP survey method remains a
controversial tool for benefit-cost analysis, every part of the survey deserves thorough
examination to ensure the quality ofthe data. Using a random utility approach, I
establish that there is a great deal of logical consistency between people's professed
attitudes toward different payment vehicles and their subsequent choices among policies
which vary in the incidence of their costs.
Chapter IV employs the same survey data used in Chapter III, but demonstrates
the potential for order effects stemming from prior attitude-elicitation questions. In
addition, it considers the potential impact of these order effects on Willingness to Pay
(WTP) estimates for climate change mitigation. I find the orderings of prior elicitation
questions may change people's opinions toward various attributes of the different
policies, and thereby increase or decrease their WTP by a substantial amount. Thus, this
chapter emphasizes the significance of order effects in prior elicitation questions, and
supports a call for diligence in using randomly ordered prior elicitation questions in
stated preference surveys, to minimize inadvertent effects from any single arbitrary
ordering.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Micro-level survey data are widely used in applied economic research. Despite
the many advantages of using such data, economists must often acknowledge that the
quality of the data can leave something to be desired. Deficiencies in survey data can
stem from poorly designed questionnaires, respondents' inattention when answering
survey questions, or compositional changes in the sample when survey data that are
collected repeatedly over a number of years. The results of research are only as good as
the quality of the data. Thus, ifit is not possible to get better data, we must develop
models that can accommodate those deficiencies which may be present. This
dissertation, which consists of three empirical papers, explores (a) the consequences of
systematic selection in a survey of health insurance reform and health care utilization in
China, (b) the systematic influence of respondents' attitudes in a stated-preference
survey of policy preferences conceming climate change mitigation (especially with
respect to the distribution of policy costs), and (c) the potential for seemingly innocuous
researcher decisions (about presentation order for information in the preamble to
preference-elicitation) to influence respondents' inferences about the degree of priority
to attach to a policy problem like climate change mitigation.
To elaborate, Chapter II demonstrates some problems encountered in the China
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) that affect the researcher"s ability to explore the
2impact of public health insurance refonn on health status and health utilization in China.
The sample suffers from selectivity problems, \vhich result from the complexity of the
reform process. China's public health insurance refonn between 1993 and 1997 did
more than just reduce the generosity of the insurance program enjoyed by those who
remained publicly insured. lt also systematically reduced eligibility, so that the
remaining membership contained a higher ratio of the educated, the elderly, employees
in state-owned enterprises, etc. This systematic selection produces a potential for
serious selectivity bias in any analysis over time.
China's policy-makers are desperate for rigorous assessments of empirically
demonstrated consequences of their country's health policy refonns. They are
particularly eager to know hmv these reforms affected health utilization and the health
status ofthe Chinese populace. However, due to the complexity of these reforms, very
little analysis oftheir consequences has appeared in either the Chinese or the
international health economics literatures. The data available for the first chapter in this
dissertation is the only data of its type. However, because of its selectivity problems, it
is not suitable for use without some aggressive conection strategies. Some of the major
remedial measures employed in this study include emphasis on a subsample that is less
likely to be afflicted by selection bias, and the use of an improved "difference-in-
ditlerences" specification that is estimated using Heckman selectivity cOlTection models
to mitigate the systematic selection problems which pervade these data.
After cOlTecting for sample selectivity (and other problems) to the extent
possible with available estimators, I find that the health insurance reforms between
31993 and 1997 resulted in an approximately 23% decline in health care utilization and
about a 41 % increase in the propensity of individuals in the "publicly insured" group to
report being "recently sick." These findings, while seemingly very simple, actually
represent the first solid empirical evidence that public health insurance refonn in China
has had measurable effects on both health care utilization and health status. Both have
been affected adversely, and to a significant extent. These main findings have important
policy implications for China's public decision making, as well as for other low and
middle income developing countries which may intend to adapt their public health
services during the process of transition to a market economy.
Chapter III examines a common empirical issue in stated preference (SP)
surveys designed to elicit the non-market value of a public environmental good. At
issue is the question of whether systematic variation in stated policy preferences reflects
respondents' attitudes and opinions. SP survey methods remain a controversial tool for
benefit-cost analysis, but they are still sometimes the only source of any type of demand
information about fundamentally non-market goods. Economists are skeptical about
any type of demand infOlmation other than "revealed preferences." Thus it is important
that every aspect of an SP survey should be subjected to thorough examination to ensure
the quality of the data. "Construct validity" is often one criterion upon which SP data
are judged. How well do the respondent's marginal utilities for different policy
attributes (inferred from respondents' preferences across alternatives with different
mixes of attributes) confonn with the same respondent's attitudes about related issues?
4Do the estimated marginal utilities vary systematically, in the expected direction, with
the individual's opinions about related matters?
In Chapter III, we use an available online survey about preferences with respect
to alternative climate change mitigation policies to examine construct validity with
respect to results concerning the distribution of policy costs and the seriousness of the
adverse consequences expected if a policy of business-as-usual is followed. Our
findings suggest that the respondent's utility level increases with the cost shares borne
via the respondent's more-prefeITed "payment vehicles" and decreases with the cost
shares borne via less-preferred payment vehicles. Utility from avoided climate change
impacts is also increasing with the individual's subjective level of WOITY about the
vulnerability of specified climate "services'" to the impacts of climate change (such as
agriculture and water, or ecosystems). Other findings are also consistent with our
theoretical prediction. Taken together, our results provide evidence of construct validity
for this particular survey and simultaneously demonstrate an appropriate strategy that
should probably be planned-for and executed for other, future stated preference surveys.
In the literature about stated preference surveys, earlier researchers have
documented that a good's placement among a sequence of goods in a set of valuation
questions can have a substantial impact on people's valuation of this particular good.
However, the economic consequences of potential order effects stemming from
questions prior to the valuation task have received surprisingly little attention. In
Chapter IV, we take advantage of the fact that the online climate change survey used in
Chapter III departs from conventional SP surveys in that the design of the questionnaire
5incorporates an unusually wide alTay of dynamically generated randomized elicitation
formats. In particular, virtually every time that information could be displayed in an
arbitrary order, this order was randomized across respondents.
In Chapter IV, we focus on cues about importance that respondents may
subliminally draw from the presentation of information in the preamble to the main
policy choice question in a stated preference survey. Is it possible to manipulate,
unintentionally, respondent's choices on the key policy-choice question in a stated
preference survey? Can this manipulation stem from the presentation of information
well before the actual choice scenario that is the focus of the research? Can the eventual
willingness-to-pay measures derived from stated-preference choices be "steered" (either
intentionally or unintentionally) by the researcher's seemingly innocuous decisions
about how to present information in the "tutorial" pOliion of a survey?
Chapter IV identifies order effects created by prior attitude-elicitation questions,
and assesses the potential impact of these order effects on willingness to pay (WTP)
estimates for stylized climate change policies. I find that the orderings in prior
elicitation questions may change people's opinions toward various attributes of the
good, and thereby increase or decrease WTP by a substantial amount. Thus, it
emphasizes the significance of order effects in prior elicitation questions, and supports a
call for diligence in using randomly ordered prior elicitation questions in stated
preference surveys to minimize inadvertent effects from any single arbitrary ordering.
The suite of papers that constitute this dissertation thus share a common thread
in their concem for some distressingly common deficiencies in household-level micro
6data gathered via surveys. Each paper concerns a pressing policy concem-the efficacy
of health care refonn in China in the case of Chapter II, and public preferences over
climate change mitigation policies in the case of Chapters III and IV. In each
application, it would be possible to analyze the available data naively, using packaged
econometric software. In each case. however, it is demonstrated that deficiencies in the
data mean that more effort is required to discern the implications of the available survey
data for the policy questions at hane!.
7CHAPTER II
HOW DID CHINESE PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM
BETWEEN 1993 AND 1997 INFLUENCE HELATH CARE
DEMAND AND HEALTH STATUS?
Introduction
As China launched its economic reforms in the late 1970s, its health care system
encountered severe cost-escalation and cost-effectiveness problems due to conf1icts
between the new market-based economy and the old command economy. To resolve
these problems, the Chinese govemment implemented a series of refonns beginning in
the mid-1980s, aimed at reducing the generosity of publicly supported insurance
programs, and thereby containing health care costs.
Since the 1950s, the publicly supported insurance programs, including
Govemment Insurance Schemes (GIS) and Labor Insurance Schemes (LIS), had
protected virtually all urban dwellers and some rural people. J Not surprisingly, refonn
to these extensive public insurance schemes, which occulTed in the mid-1980s, affected
a huge proportion of the Chinese populace. The refonn was highly decentralized and
I The Govemment Insurance Scheme (GIS) provided coverage for employees in govemment agencies
and people working in the health and education sectors. The Labor Insurance Scheme (US) provided full
benefits to employees in state or collective enterprises and partial coverage for their immediate family
members. The "Rural Cooperative Medical System" (RCMS) provided low-cost basic health care for
most rural residents at the commune level. By the late 1970s, these three health insurance schemes
covered roughly 90% of the Chinese populace (including virtually all urban residents and 85% of those in
rural areas) (World Bank, 1997).
8nation-wide, associated with a change in the composition of participants and other
refonlls to Chinese infrastructure that were carried out simultaneously. These features
make China's health care refonn a unique laboratory for infelTing the implications of
refonl1 in developing or 100Ner income countries that intend to adapt their health care
services to a market-oriented economy; on the other hand, these features make
evaluating the reform extremely challenging (Langan, 1993; Bloom, 1998; Blumenthal
et a1., 2005).
The public insurance reform process began in the mid-1980s and ended in the
late-1990s, with the introduction of a new type of insurance scheme involving a three-
layer payment system, replacing the publicly supported insurance programs GIS and
LIS. 2 The public insurance reform, at its beginning stage, had little effect on cost
escalation (Grogan, 1995; Liu et a1., 1995; Liu, 2002). It is well-known that reforms in
the mid-I 990s led to a decrease in the number of participants (Guo, 2003; Akin et a1.,
2004) and greater cost-sharing by the remaining patients (Wong et a1.). Recent work has
identified a 19% increase in out-of-pocket costs for the publicly insured over this period
(Cai, 2007). Although Chinese policymakers were eager to detennine how the generosity
reduction atIected health care demand, no studies have definitively answered this
question.
2 The three layers are: individual medical savings accounts (MSAs): out-of-pocket spending by
beneficiaries in the fonn of deductibles; and social risk pooling. Enrollees are expected to pay for
outpatient care through MSAs. After the MSAs are exhausted, enrollees need to pay a deductible and a
copayment, and the rest of the cost should be covered by the social risk pooling funds. Some pilot cities,
such as Zhenjiang and .liujiang, were selected to carry out this stage ofrefol111S as early as 1994 (Liu,
2002).
This study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it provides
empirical evidence of how health care utilization and health status were affected when
public insurance refonn decreased program generosity. Previous studies use only
summary statistics and suggest that there was no significant change in health conditions,
but a 50% decline in inpatient health utilization (Gao et al., 2001). Using the Heckman
selection correction model in the context of a difference-in-difference regression, the
present study shows that health insurance reform decreased the health care utilization of
publicly insured individuals by about 23%, and increased their likelihood of getting sick
by 41 %. Second, existing studies have identified a price elasticity of demand of 0.7 and
an income elasticity of demand of "somewhat above unity" (Chow, 2006) based on
provincial- and country-level data. The present study uses individual-level data and
identifies a price elasticity of 1.65 and an insignificant income elasticity of health-care
demand. The differences between the two studies may result from the different attributes
of the data sets, as models based on individual data are capable of controlling for many
individual characteristics that provincial-level data would fail to capture. Therefore, the
estimated price elasticity using provincial- or country-level data may not as accurate as
the one obtained in this study.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section II: Data Sources; Second
III: Empirical Model; Section IV: Estimation Results; Second V: Health Status
Deterioration; Section VI: FUliher Robustness Check; Section VII: Price Elasticity;
Section VIII: Plice Elasticity and Implications; and Section VIII: Conclusions.
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Data
The data come from the "China Health and Nutrition Survey" (CHNS). This
survey is a collaborative effort involving the National Institute of Nutrition and Food
Safety (INFS), the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC), and the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH). It is a unique micro-level
longitudinal survey which was conducted in the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997,2000
and 2004 for nine provinces in China. 3 The choice of survey jurisdictions was based on
a random selection process."
The summary statistics for the years 1989 to 2000 are reported in Table I, and
variable definitions are provided in Table A.I. The available demographic infonnation
suggests roughly constant proportions male and urban over the years in question. The
consistent increases in average age reflect the nonnal pattem of aging; the increasing
trend in household incomes reflects China's recent high annual growth rates ofGDP.
The proportion employed increased from 77% to 89% between 1989 and 1993, then
dropped to 69% in the late 1990s. This trend coincides with China's enterprise refoTIn
(in the late 1990s) that laid off large numbers of workers, especially in state-owned and
collective enterplises. Not surprisingly, the proportion of people working in state-owned
or collective enterprises declined in the late I990s. The proportion of the population
having health insurance dropped from 24% to 16% in 2000. This is most likely due to
the fact that the two main health insurance schemes are mostly employment-based.
3 Eight provinces, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, were
surveyed from 1989 to 1993. [n the year 1997, the province of Liaoning was excluded, and the province
of Heilongjiang was added to the survey. In the year 2000, all nine provinces were included in the survey.
4 See the CHNS website: http://viww.cpc.uncedu/china
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Workers lose their health insurance when they become unemployed. The proportion of
publicly insured individuals (either GIS or LIS) decreased slightly from 1989 to 1993,
while it dropped drastically after 1993. This conesponds with findings, in the previous
literature, that reforms after 1993 largely reduced the number of publicly insured
individuals. Commercial insurance, as a new type of insurance, has been included in the
CHNS since the year 1997. 5 We also observe that people switch from the less-educated
categories to more-educated categories, which reflects China's improvement in overall
educational attainment. A roughly equal number of individuals were surveyed in each
. 6proVl11ce.
One major concern is the shrinking sample size of publicly insured individuals.
The public insurance reform over the 1990s reduced the number of program paliicipants.
The size of the publicly insured sample (GIS or LIS insured) shrinks from 2920 persons
in 1989 to 801 persons in 2000 (Table 2). The surviving group has higher proportions of
males, urban residents, the rich, the elderly, the highly educated people, and
professionals than does the aggregate sample. Most importantly, compositional
variations over the years suggest that the eligibility criteria may have changed as the
reform went along: First, the proportions of highly educated people (especially those
5 The first Chinese insurance company which provided medical care services was established in 1996. Its
predecessor organization, the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC), did not start to seU medical
care insurance for young people until 1992. Not surprisingly, commercial insurance was not a popular
fonn of insurance until the late 1990s (Xinhua News Agency, December 5, 1995; The Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, January 29, 1993).
6 The discussion suggests that social refonns and nonnal development, rather than simply attrition, may
account for changes in sample composition. To assess this conjecture, I further investigate whether the
"missing" or "replacement" individuals consistently exhibit particular characteristics over the years that
might alter the sample's composition. These estimations support the randomness of the sample. The
results are available from the author.
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with a college degree or above) increase at a greater rate than in the full sample. Second,
fanners, skilled workers, unskilled workers and service workers are less well-
represented, while professionals, administrators and staff become better-represented in
the publicly insured sample in later sample years. In addition, provinces differ
considerably in the rates at which public insurance prevalence declines, which indicates
a heterogeneous process of refom1. Summary statistics for the publicly insured
subsample indicate that the publicly insured group had been narrowed down to a group
of individuals with specific attributes as health reforms proceeded during the 1990's.
This brings up a potentially severe selection problem that I will discuss extensively in
the following sections.
Empirical Model
One important issue is to measure health utilization change. In the CHNS data,
respondents who had been "sick" over the last four weeks were asked to indicate how
they treated their illness from the following altematives: 1. went to see a doctor; 2. went
to a countryside clinic; 3. did not pay any attention; 4. took care of it on their own. I
created a variable "care" which equals one if the person chose altemative I or 2, and
zero otherwise. Therefore, health care utilization is quantified as a dummy variable for
the decision to seek professional (i.e hospital or clinic) care, conditional on being sick.
Using data for 1993 and 1997 to represent the periods before and after the policy
change, respectively, I next employ the "difference-in-difference" (DD) method to
examine how the policy change affected the health care utilization of the publicly
--------------- --------------
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insured. With the DD method, the treatment group is defined as the group affected both
by the policy of interest and economywide trends, while the control group is affected
only by economywide trends. In my study, publicly insured individuals comprised the
treatment group of interest, and the control group consisted of uninsured individuals
who are not covered by any type of health insurance and thus should not be affected by
any insurance-related policy change. Ideally, the control group should resemble the
treatment group in all aspects except that they do not experience the health policy
refonn of interest. However, in our case, the publicly insured and uninsured groups
differ not only in their insurance status, but also in their demographic information,
education, working status, etc, due to the nature of the public insurance program
(Henderson et al., 1995). As Tables 2 and 3 suggest, compared with the uninsured group.
the publicly insured group is more urban, older, richer, and better educated.
Another approach to arguing for the validity of the control group is to
demonstrate that it experiences similar compositional changes to those seen in the
treatment group during the sample period. However, in our case, public health insurance
refonn over this period not only reduced program generosity, but also cut off those with
specific attributes. Following Finkelstein (Finkelstein, 20(2), I reported the means of
the treatment and the control groups before and after the reform in Table 4. The column
"difference-in-difference" compares the change in the means of the publicly insured
group before and after the health reform to the change in the means of the uninsured
group before and after the refonn. An insignificant coefficient in this column suggests
similar trends for the treatment and the control groups. Most of the differential changes
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between the treatment and the control groups are indeed significant. Thus, the
conventional DO method is not applicable unless we first address the selection problem.
I next employ the Heckman selection correction model to compensate for the
endogeneity of being publicly insured or uninsured.
The Heckman selection model is a very powerful technique for use in
accommodating sample-selection problems. The recent literature describes its utility for
addressing sample attrition problems (Hirano et aI., 2001). Briefly, the idea behind
Heckman's method can be described as follows. Let the equation which cletem1ines the
"smnple selection" be z = 11" Y + U , and let the "outcome equation" be )i. = x·'fJ + E,
I ' I " f I 1
the observation Yi is observed only if Zi >0.
7
It is preferable to have identifying exogenous variables in the selection equation
which do not also appear in the outcome equation. Sometimes, however, the same set of
v31iables serves as regressors for the "selection equation" as for the "outcome
equation." Since unobserved heterogeneity may affect the selectivity equation and the
outcome equation at the same time. examining the significance of the unobserved
heterogeneity is an important step in the Heckman selectivity correction model.
7 Under the assumption that y and z follow a j01l1t normal distribution with correlation p , we have
E[y·1 z* > OJ = E[ V III > -H;y.J = x '13+ E[E Ill. > -w'vJ = x·'fJ+ per iLea ) = x·'fJ+ fJi iL (a )
I r ~ I I f I [I /ill' I If I 'f tI
Where a = -w'y / er ,and it(a ) = 'A(H:y / er )/ <D(vt;Y / er )
/I I 1/ /, Y' I /I I /I
So y I z' > 0 = E[ J! I z > OJ + l' = x '13 + jJ,it(a ) + v
. I I . I I J I /. I 1/ I
(Greene. 2003).
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I next apply difference-in-difference (DO) method to the outcome equation to
evaluate the effect of policy change on health utilization. The idea of the DO method is
illustrated in Table 5. Conditional on being recently sick, compared with year 1993,
3.69% more uninsured sought professional care in year 1997, while 11.9% less publicly
insured sought professional care. Note that the increased health care utilization of the
uninsured group represents impacts on health care utilization from economywide
changes. The change in health utilization of the publicly insured can be broken down
into two parts: the impact of economywide changes and the impact of the reform. Under
the DD assumption that the impact of economywide changes on health care utilization
of the treatment group is identical to that of the control group, the reform itself resulted
in about 15.6% fewer doctor visits for the publicly insured.
The Heckman selectivity conection model is identified by the following two-
equation structure, where equation (1) is the selection equation and equation (2) is the
outcome equation.
r Province + It.p p /" Ipl (1)
Where
fJ~sicklevel+ 5 province + £ ,:' I P P Ip (2)
care,!'! =1 if the person sought hospital or clinic care when he/she was sick; zero if
otherwise;
Z, is a vector of individual demographic characteristics such as age, gender, etc;
16
publicinsured, = 1 if he/she is public insured; =0 otherwise;
)lear1997 =1 ifyear=1997' =0 if v ear=1993'
• I J'
provinceI' is a set of province dummy variables;
sick/evel, is a set of dummies of self-reported measure of sickness, including "not
severe," "sOlnewhat severe" and "very severe;"
selection/PI is a dummy variable; =1 if the observation belongs to either the publicly
insured or the uninsured group; =0 if the person is otherwise insured.
The selection equation, equation(1) determines inclusion of the observation in
the estimating sample for the outcome equation. If the individual is either publicly
insured or uninsured, the observation is used in estimating the outcome model and the
"selection" variable is set equal to one. The interaction term Z, x year1997, captures the
differential selection, pre- and post-reform, into the two groups. Equation(2), the
outcome equation, is estimated only if the dependent variable selection/PI in equation (1)
equals one. The key coefficient fJ4 in the outcome equation measures the change in
health care utilization that can be imputed to the health care ref01111.
Estimation Results
Estimation results are reported in Table 6. The results for the Heckman selection
model are presented in two columns. The first column is the outcome equation
(equation2), which explains the variation in health care utilization. The outcome
equation is estimated as a linear probability model. The second colum is the selection
17
equation (equation I), which is estimated as a probit model. In addition to the selection
correction model, a linear probability model (LPM) with individual-specific fixed
effects, and a simple LPM, are provided for comparison. Table 6 suggests that more-
educated people are more likely to seek professional care than less-educated people.
Publicly insured individuals have a higher propensity to seek health care than the
uninsured.8
The estimated coefficient on household income is negative and never
statistically significant in these models. This implies a low income elasticity of health
care demand, in contrast to the income elasticity of "somewhat above unity" identified
in Chow's work (2006). This disparity may be attributable to the different types of data
used in the two studies. Models based on individual data pem1it the researcher to
control for many personal characteristics, whereas models based on provincial-level
data cannot.
Across all three different models, the coefficients on the variable
"publicinsured x yearl99T are all negative, with similar magnitudes, and are
statistically significant. The estimated effect of health insurance reform on health care
utilization, from the Heckman model, is larger than the estimate from the LPM. This
indicates a downward bias in the simple LPM estimates. The P-value of the t-test for the
estimated error correlation parameter p suggests insignificant unobserved-but-correlated
heterogeneity. I conclude that the finding that health care refonTIs decreased the health
care utilization of publicly insured individuals by about 18% is a fairly robust result.
8 This finding is not robust in the model with individual fixed effects. possibly due to the limited size of
the sample, which includes only those who are consistenlly publicly insured or consistently uninsured.
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Effects on Health Status
Respondents \vere asked about their habits in seeking professional health care
only if they had been sick over the last four weeks. This is a non-trivial conditioning
problem. Suppose the health refonns between 1993 and 1997 substantially reduced the
likelihood of being sick; then a decrease in health care utilization by publicly insured
individuals could be attributed to an improvement in their health status. The task of this
section is to determine whether health status changed pursuant to China's health care
refonns.
As before, I employ a diffcrence-in-difference technique with publicly insured
and uninsured workers as the treatment and the control groups, respectively. Health
status is measured as the propensity to have been sick within the last four weeks. 9 As
Table 7 illustrates, while the publicly insured are four percent more likely to be sick in
1997 than in 1993, the uninsured were 0.4 percent more likely to be sick over the same
period. Health policy changes appear to have resulted in a 3.5 percent relative increase
in the propensity for individuals to have been sick during the most recent four weeks.
The estimating specification takes the following form:
sickiPI = 130 + 13 I Z, + 13cpub/icinsurec( + 131vear19971 + 134 (public, x year1997J
+5 province + £P r Ipr (4)
9 The surveys were conducted 111 fall and winter each year, specifically, in September, October and
November. Therefore. we expect to see little seasonal variation on the propensity of being sick within the
previous four weeks.
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Where
sick,p, = 1 if the person got sick over the last four weeks, zero otherwise;
Zj is a vector of individual demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education
etc;
publicinsuredj = 1 if the individual is publicly insured; =0 otherwise;
year1997, =1 ifyear=1997; =0 ifyear=1993;
provincep is a set of province dummy variables;
selectionjp, =1 if the observation belongs to either the treatment or the control group; =0
otherwise.
The selection equation (3) for this Heckman cOlTection model controls for
systematic selection of the observations into the publicly insured or the uninsured
sample. The interaction teIl11 Zj x year1997, makes it possible to capture the differential
selection into the sample used to estimate the outcome equation. fJ4 is the key
coefficient assessing the health status change of the publicly insured compared with the
uninsured. Estimation results are presented in Table 8. The estimated coefficients on
"household income," "age" and "education attainment" are statistically significant and
bear the expected signs: higher-income, young and better-educated individuals have
better health. Urban dwellers appear to be more likely to get sick than those living in
rural areas. This may reflect the greater environmental pollution and higher population
densities (and therefore contagion) in urban China. The individual fixed effects model
suggests that publicly insured individuals have worse health than the uninsured. This
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confinns earlier findings that the jobs of the publicly insured involve more high-stress
office work and less outdoor physical activity, which may contribute to health problems
(Ding, 1994). The key coefficients (on publicinsured x year1997) are statistically
significant in all three models, and suggest an approximately 3% increase in the
likelihood of getting sick for the publicly insured relative to the uninsured. Heckman's
model slightly reduces the magnitude of the key coefficient compared to the simple
LPM. This indicates that simple LPM estimates may be biased slightly upward. The P-
value of t-test for the estimated error con-elation p suggests insignificant unobserved-
but-correlated heterogeneity.
Robustness
The findings in the last two sections imply that the health refonns in China
between 1993 and 1997 decreased health care utilization and worsened the average
health status ofthe publicly insured. The evidence thus far does not support the
conjecture that lower health care utilization rates resulted primarily from improved
health. Rather, the results suggest that health refonns decreased the health care
utilization of publicly insured individuals. As is well established in the health
economics literature, the less health care utilization is likely lead to a worse health
condition, my estimations of the previous section indicates a decline in health status of
the publicly insured group. As a robustness check, I improve upon equation (2) by
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correcting for the potential selection into the sample of "being recently sick."IO In this
section, the sample being used consists of the publicly insured and the uninsured groups
only. II The results of a Heckman selection model and simple LPM are reported in Table
9.
The selection equation in Table 9 (the second column) confinns the previous
finding that the more-educated and those with higher incomes are less likely to become
sick; the publicly insured, older people, and urban dwellers have worse health
conditions than their counterparts. The key coefficient on (publicinsured*year1997)
confinns previous findings in Table 6 that health care refonns between 1993 and 1997
reduced health care utilization by about 18% (after correcting for systematic selection
into the sample of "being recently sick"). Some incidental results from previous
sections-e.g. that the publicly insured and more-educated people are more likely to
seek professional care-are less robust. Compared with the pre-reform stage, health
utilization decreased by 18176.98%~=23%, and the percentage-increase in reported
illness is: 317.23% ~=41%.12
10 I do not focus on the selection into the treatment and the control groups in this section for the following
two reasons: 1. The estimates of simple LPM model appear to be biased downward compared with
Heckman's selectivity correction model (Table 6). Ignoring this selection could only understate my result.
2. Since the Heckman selection model cannot control for two types of selection at the same lime in
existing versions of Stata, I resort to using Limdep. Correcting for two types of selection at the same time
using Limdep actually enhances both the significance and magnitude of my key coefficient (Table A.2).
II People with other types of insurance, such as commercial insurance, work unit insurance, cooperative
medical insurance, dependents' medical insurance, Maternal and Child health care insurance and planned
immunization insurance, are excluded from the sample.
12 The initial rate of seeking professional care for the publicly insured is 76.98% (Table 5): the 1Ilitiai
percentage of reported illness for the publicly insured is 7.23'10 (Table 7).
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The large decrease in health care utilization may be evident for two reasons: first,
previous studies claimed that ~'financial difficulty" is the main reason why people opted
not to seek professional medical care during 1993-1998 (Gao et a!., 200 I; Renmin Daily,
May 16, 1995). Facing a larger share of health expenses, the publicly insured were
afraid to go to a hospital or clinic for professional care because they wished to avoid
paying huge medical bills. Second, it indicates a large price elasticity of health care
demand.
Price Elasticity
In this section, I will explore the price elasticity of demand for health care in
China, based on the sample of participants who had some percentage of outpatient or
inpatient reimbursement (the "Co-payment" participants). The "Co-payment"
participants sample is used for the following two reasons:
1. Using the same data, my previous research identified that refonns over this time
interval increased out-of.-pocket medical care costs by 19% based on this group of
people (Cai, 2007). This finding can be used to infer the price increase.
2. This group is the largest category among all major forms of public 1l1surance
schemes. 13
13 There were four major types of reimbursement methods. 1. ~'Upper limit" on reimbursement~patients
had to pay a certain percentage if the expenditure was above the upper limit. 2. ~'Deductible'-~
expenditures could be reimbursed at a certain percentage if the expenditure was above the deductible, 3.
~'Co-payment"~ a certain percentage of outpatient or inpatient care expenditure can be covered. The
participants should pay the rest of the expcnditme. 4. "'Distributed medical expenses'-~thework unit
distributed a certain amount of money for medical care to each individual. He/she could keep the money
if the person did not need it for medical expenses. Both the 1993 and 1997 surveys suggest these
categories are mutually exclusi\"C.
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Thus, I apply the estimating specification from the last section to the "Co-
payment" participants (the treatment group) and the uninsured group (the control group).
The results are repOlied in Table 10. These estimates suggest that health care refonns
between 1993 and 1997 reduced the rate of seeking professional health care for "Co-
payment participants" by 24.1 % compared to the uninsured, with a 95% confidence
interval that includes increases from 6% to 42%. Therefore, the percentage-decrease in
health care utilization is: 24.1/76.98%14= 31.30%, with a 95% confidence interval that
includes percentage decreases from 7.79% to 54.55%. Thus, I divide the percentage-
decrease in health care utilization (31.30%) by the percentage increase in price (19%) to
estimate price elasticity of demand, obtaining a value of 1.647, with a 95% confidence
interval that includes elasticities from 0.41 to 2.87.
Although the price elasticity of 0.7, identified in Chow's work, lies within my
95% confidence interval, my estimated price elasticity suggests that the demand of
health care is price elastic, while his result does not. The disparity may be attributed to
the different types of data used in the two studies. Individual-level data permits the
analysis to control for personal characteristics for which provincial-level data cannot
control. Therefore, the estimated price elasticity using provincial- or country-level data
may not as accurate as the one estimated using individual-level data.
I~ The initial rate of seeking professional health care for the publicly insured is 76.98% (Table 5).
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Conclusion
Using the CHNS data, I find that China's public health insurance refoml
between 1993 and 1997 lowered health care utilization rates for the publicly insured
population by about 23°'0 (after correcting for the selection problem), and increased the
likelihood of reporting recent illness by 41 % for publicly insured people. I use the
Heckman selectivity correction method to adjust my the estimates for sample selection
problems. This study provides the first solid empirical evidence that public health
insurance reform adversely affected both health care access and health status for
publicly insured individuals. It also provides new evidence concerning China's price
and income elasticities of demand for health care using household-level data. My results
indicate insignificant income elasticity but a price elasticity of 1.647. These findings
may have significant pollcy implications for China's current health care refonTIs, as
well as for other low and middle income countries intending to adapt their health
services during the process of transition to a market economy.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample
1989 199] 1993 1997 2000
Demographic information a
Male=J 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 050
Urban=1 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.31 030
Age (in years) 29.28 29.84 31.53 33.92 35.84
Household income (Chinese Yuan) 4001.46 3145.26 4110.90 10815.54 11515.67
Work status & entelprises type
Employed=1 0.77 0.80 0.89 0.78 0.69
State-owned enterprise= I 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.08
Small collective enterprise= I 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02
Large collective enterprise= I 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02
Other enterprises= 1 0.51 0.58 0.66 0.60 0.57
insurance
Insured=1 0.25 0.24 023 0.24 0.16
Publicly insured b (either GIS or LIS) =1 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.04
Commercially insured=] N/A N/A N/A 0.08 0.09
Education
No school 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.11
Primary school 0.33 031 0.34 0.34 0.25
Low middle school 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.29
Upper middle school 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
Technical school 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
College or above 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Missing data 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.19
Province c
Liaoning 0.11 0.10 0.10 N/A 0.09
Heilongjiang N/A N/A N/A 0.11 0.08
Jiangsu 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09
Shandong 0.12 0.11 0.11 011 0.08
Henan 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.09
Hubei 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09
Hunan 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.08
Guangxi 0.15 0.14 O. J3 0.14 0.11
Guizhou 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10
Observations 15924 16021 13856 13395 18604
a All values are sample means: all variables are binary indicators except '"age" and "household income"'
Household income is nominal.
b Only people having GIS or LIS as first payer are counted as "publicly insured". In 1997 and 2000. some
people had GIS or LIS as second payer and had commercial insurance as their first payor.
C Liaoning was not surveyed in 1997; Heilongjiang was not surveyed until 1997.
26
Table 2. Summary statistics for public insured (either GIS or LIS insured)
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000
Demographic injol-nJaliun a
Male=1 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.55
Urban= I 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.77 0.70
Age (in years) 39.67 35.05 37.94 43.79 46.31
Household income (Chinese Yuan) 6236.97 4937.02 5933.04 16769.10 26108.3
Work S{(llUS & enlerprises tvpe
El11ployed= I 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.74 0.63
State-owned enterprises= I 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.56 0.44
Small collective enterpriscs= I 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
Large collective enterprises= 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.08
Other enterprises= I 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08
Occupalion
Senior professional= I 0.066 0.058 0.069 0.084 0.065
Junior professional=1 0.088 0.081 0.076 0.091 0.l05
Administrator= I 0.098 0.113 0.109 0.119 0.086
Staff=1 0.096 0.092 0.095 0.102 0.085
Farmer= I 0.010 D.008 0.006 0.005 0.004
Sk ilied worker= I a 188 0.229 0.175 0.119 0.] 17
Non-ski lied worker= I 0.262 0227 0.261 0.136 0.075
Soldiel'= I 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.005
Driver= I 0.0 II 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.012
Service worker= I 0.092 0.091 0.085 0.044 0.057
Educalion
No school 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07
Primary school 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.16
Low middle school 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.24
Upper middle school DI8 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.22
Technical school 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.14
College or above 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.16
Province
Liaoning 0.180 0.177 0.176 N/A 0.027
Hei longj iang N/A NiA N!A 0.124 0.011
Jiangsu 0.167 0.163 0.177 0.231 0.412
Shandong 0.109 0.131 0.104 0.115 0.004
Henan 0.093 0082 0.077 0.105 0.080
Hubei O. lOS 0.129 0.125 0.128 0.189
Hunan 0.113 0.100 0.109 0.032 0.105
Guangxi 0.148 0.123 0.134 0.126 0.119
Guizhou 0.085 0.095 0.097 0.141 0.054
Observations
2920 2603 2128 lOla 801
a All values are sample means: all variables are binary indicators except "age" and "household income"
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Table 3. Summary statistics for uninsured group (the control group)
1989 199] 1993 1997 2000
Demographic information ,
Male=l 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49
Urban= I 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.24
Age (in years) 27.79 29.85 30.39 33.03 35.27
Household income (Chinese Yuan) 3359.22 2668.53 3529.38 9565.53 9823.25
Work status & entelprises type
Employed= ] 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.79 0.69
State-owned enterprises= I 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
Small collective enterprises= I 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02
Large collective enterprises= 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.0]
Other enterprises= I 0.67 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.62
Occupation
Senior professional= I 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.007
Junior professional=1 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008
Adm inistrator'~1 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.010
Staff= ] 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.011
Fanner= I 0.434 0.393 0.452 0.402 0.294
Skilled worker= I 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.027 0.026
Non-skilled worker=l 0.037 0.033 0.054 0.048 0.042
Soldier=1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Driver= I 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.010
Service worker=] 0.029 0.0] 6 0.041 0.050 0.043
Education
No school 0.206 0.182 0.228 0170 0.1 \2
Primary school 0.374 0.321 0.375 0.369 0.255
Low middle school 0.248 0.228 0.292 0.320 0.292
Upper middle school 0.068 0.058 0.072 0.089 0.085
Technical school 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.022 0.022
College or above 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.016
Prm'ince
Liaoning 0.09 0.08 0.09 N/A 0.08
Heilongjiang N/A N/A N/A 0.12 0.08
.liangsu 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05
Shandong 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07
Henan 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.10
Hubei 0.13 0.65 0.14 0.14 0.10
Hunan 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.]2 0.08
Guangxi 0.1:5 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.10
Guizhou 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.11
Obsel'1'ations
11743 12196 10081 10163 15520
, All values are sample means; all variables are binary indicators except "age" and "household income"
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Table 4. Weighted means: publicly insured YS. uninsured
1993 1993 1997 1997 Difference In
public insured uninsured public insured uninsured Difference"
Df'lJlographlc infhrmotiot/
~,Ialc= I 0.58 049 0.57 0.50 0.02
(-049) (-050) (049) (050 ) (002)
Urban= I 0.63 O. J 9 077 0.26 0.07'"
(-048) (039) (042) (044) (-002)
Age (in vears) 37.94 30.39 43.79 33.17 -0.017
(-1601 ) ( 1980) ( 15(5) (3533) (053)
Household income (Chinese
Yuan) 5909 3530 16769 9595 4794***
(-7523) (9610) ( 11293) (126M) (448)
H'ork SlO{lfS & enterprise trpe
work 075 087 074 079 0.020
(-020) (033) (044) (041) (018)
Stale-()\\ ned cnlerprise=l 0.66 0.04 0.56 0.05 -0.11***
(-047) (019) (050) (021 ) (00 I)
Small collective enterprise= I 006 0.05 004 0.03 -0.001
(-023) (021 ) (0 19) (0 16) (0008)
Large coliecti,·e enlerl'mc= i 0.17 003 009 0.02 -O.O7**'
(-038) (Oi6) (029) (0 i3) (001 )
Occupation
Senior professional= I 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.003 0.02***
(-026) 10.07) (028) (005) (000)
Junior professlonal= I 0.08 0.0 I 0.09 0.007 0.0 I
(-027) (007) (029) (009) (00 I)
Administrator= I 011 0.02 0.12 0.01 (00 I
(-032) (0 10) (032) (0.12) (0.62)
Staft'" I 009 001 0.10 0.01 0.01
(-029) (008) (030) (Oil) (001 )
Farmer=1 001 045 000 040 0.05***
(-008) (050) (007) (049) (002)
Skilled '\orker= I 018 0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.06***
(-038) (015) (032) (0 16) (001)
Non-skilled \\'orkcr= I 0.25 0.05 o 14 0.05 -0 I 1***
(-044) (023) (034) (021 ) (001 )
Soldier=1 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.01 -0.0008
a All means are weighted. Standard deviations are reported 111 parentheses for the first (l1Ur columns and standard errors in
parentheses are rcponed for difference-in-difference column. which compares the means of the public insured group before and
atier the health reform to the means of the uninsured group before and alier the reform. Standard errors of ditTercnce-in-difference
are obtained by regressing the characteristic on "yearI99T and "public insured" dummies and an interaction term bet\\cen
"year 199T and "publ ic insured"
***significant at 1%: **signitlcant at 5%:*signitleanl at 10%
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Table 4 (continued)
(-009) (003) (008) (003) (0002)
Driver=1 001 0.01 0.01 001 -0.01***
(-0 12) (008) (009) (0 II) (000)
Service worker= I 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 -005***
(-028) ((UO) (020) (022) (fJO I )
Education
No school 0.08 023 0.05 o 17 OOP*'
(OD) (OA2) (023) (038) (002)
Primary school 0.21 0.37 o 16 0.37 -0.05***
(OAI) (OA8) (0.37) (OA8) (002)
Low middle school 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.32 -0.08***
(OA7) (045) (OA4) (OA7) (002)
Upper middle school 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.09 -002***
(OAO) (026) (039) (028) (001)
Technical school 0.09 0.0 1 0.15 0.02 OJ)5***
(028) (009) (035) (0 15) (00 I)
College or abO\·e 0.11 0.004 0.17 0.01 0.06***
(0.31 ) (006) (038) ((1I1) (0 (1)
Prol'iJ1(,(?
Liaoning o 18 0.09 NIA NIA -0.09***
(-038) (028) (()() I)
Heilongjiang Nll\ Ni.A 0.12 0.12 ()() I
(033) (033) (001 )
JiangslI 0.17 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.06***
(-038) (027) (042) (0.27) ((JOl)
Shandong Ol! 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.03***
(031) (OJO) (032) (028) (()() I)
Henan 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.04***
(027) (0.35) (031) (034) (00 I)
Hubei 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 001
(033 ) (035) (033) (035) (001 )
Hllllan 011 0.14 0.03 0.12 -0.06* **
(031 ) (034 ) (0 18) 1033) (00 I)
Guangxi a 13 0.14 0.13 0.15 -0 01
(033 ) (035 ) (033) (036) (00 I)
Guizhou 010 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.04*"
030) (0.371 (035) (037) 1001 )
Observations 2128 10081 1010 10163
Table S. Illustration of DD calculation for Health Care Utilization
Public insured vs. uninsured
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Group/year
public insured
uninsured
1993 1997
A= 0.7698 (N93= 137) C= 0.6506 (N97=83)
B= 0.7270 (N93=326) D= 0.7638 (N97=343)
Time difference
within group
C-A= -0.1192
D-B= +0.0369
difference in
proportions at each
point in time A-B= 0.0428 C-D= -0.1132
Difference-in-
difference
(C-A) - (D-B)=
-0.1560
Note: Numbers are the proportion seeking professional care when sick~ non-workers are excluded.
31
Table 6. Assessing effects of policy change on health care utilization a
LPM with
individual
Fixed effect
care
Heckman selection
model
care selection
Simple LPM
care
Observations 890 998
no
yes
998
yes
yes
0.067
(2.37)**
0.123
(1.99)**
-0.178
(2.66)***
-1.1 09
(0.43)
-0.001
(1.06)
0.005
(2.24)**
-0.022
(1.53)
-0.007
(1.02)
0.880
(11.05)***
yes
yes
yes
yes
2432
-5.641
(0.70)
-15.90
( 1.93)*
-0.030
(2.08)**
-0.048
(2.00)**
0.228
(0.63)
-1.762
(3.65)***
-0.158
(0.02)
yes
yes
0.060
(1.37)
0.135
(1.97)**
-0.189
(2.48)**
-1.576
(0.69)
-0.001
(1.20)
0.004
(1.98)**
-0.045
(1.38)
-0.044
(1.19)
0.883
(4.00)** *
yes
yes
0.046
(1.21 )
0.090
(1.37)
-0.195
(2.59)***
-1.663
(0.73)
-0.002
(1.96)**
0.005
(2.05)**
1.004
(4.02)***
year1997
publicinsured
publicinsured x year1997
urban
educational attainment
(in years)
male
household income
(in '000000 Yuan)
age
Constant
Sick level included
Occupation &enterprises
included
Interaction terms included no no
Province dummy variables no yes
P-value oft-test for p =0 0.248
R-squared 0.06
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
a For the simple LPM and the Heckman selectivity correction models, the robust standard errors are
reported to adjust the possible heteroscedasticity.
Table 7. Illustration ofDD for health status
public insured vs. uninsured
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Group/year
public insured
uninsured
difference in proportions at
each point in time
1993
A= 0.072389
(N93=1934)
B= 0.053453
(N93= 6,306)
A-B= 0.018936
1997
C= 0.112925
(N97=735)
D= 0.058147
(N97= 6,128)
C-D= 0.054778
Difference- in-
difference
Time difference
within group
C-A= +0.0405364
D-B= +0.0046949
(C-A) -(D-B) =
+0.0358415
Nole: numbers are mean ratio of people gets sick; non-workers are excluded.
33
Table 8. The effects of policy change on health statusa
sicksick selection
-------.-----------...-.-----~--.---..---.--.~--_=_=:c:__:--
LPM with Heckman selection model LPM
individual
fixed effect
sick
yearl997
publicinsured
publicinsured x year1997
household income
(in '0000000 Yuan)
age
educational attainment
(in years)
male
urban
Constant
Occupation &enterprise
included
Interaction terms included
Province dummy variables
Observations
0.006
(1.33)
0.018
(2.24)**
0.037
(3.26)***
-4.431
(2.38)**
0.0004
(6.12)***
-0.007
(3.45)***
0.227
(1.49)
yes
no
no
14997
0.007
(1.10)
0.008
(0.93)
0.034
(3.10)**
-3.867
(2.33)**
0.0004
(6.32)***
-0.002
(5.83 )***
0.001
(1.34)
0.026
(4.23)***
0.074
(4.15)***
yes
no
yes
15039
-1.603
(3.44)*" *
-49.32
( 1.60)
-0.012
(3.53)***
-0.023
(3.69)***
0.086
(0.58)
-1.283
(12.38)***
1.985
(3.93)***
yes
yes
yes
16573
0.005
(0.68)
0.011
(1.49)
0.036
(2.80)***
-3.421
(3.56)***
0.0004
(1.20)
-0.001
(3.31)***
-0.001
0.027
(4.87)***
0.069
(2.99)***
yes
no
yes
15039
P-va1ue oft-test for p =0
R-squared
0.228
0.02
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%;***significant at 1%
a For the simple LPM and the Heckman selectivity correction models, the robust standard errors are
reported to adjust the possible heteroscedasticity.
Table 9. Further Robustness Check.
-------~--~-~-------~~--~---------------------------
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Heckman selection model
( I ) (2)
care sick
year 1997 0.083 0.078
(J .48) ( 1.90)*
pub Iic insured 0.098 0.224
(1.47) (3.34)***
publ icinsured x year 1997 -0.186
(2.15)**
household income -10.15 -46.91
(in '0000000 Yuan) (0.29) (2.17)**
age -0.00 I 0.002
(0.96) (4.67)***
educat ional atta inl11ent 0.005 -0.015
(in ye3l's) ( 1.52) (6.96)***
male -0046 0.Q28
(0.98) (0.79)
urban -0.030 0.221
(0.24) (5.48)***
Constant 0.925 -1.414
(2.66)*** (2165)***
LPM
(3)
care
0.078
(2.07)**
0.087
( 1.55)
-0.184
(2.34)**
-7.956
(0.29)
-0.00 I
( 1.02)
0.006
(213)**
-0.047
(0.96)
-0.039
(0.32)
0.993
(13.12)***
Sick level
Occupation &
enterprises included
Province dUl11my
Observations
P-value oft-test for
p=O
R-squared
yes
yes
yes
883
0.952
no
yes
yes
14986
yes
yes
yes
883
0.05
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10. Estimation using the sample consisting of "co-payment" participants and
"uninsured"
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Heckman selection model LPM
year1997
public insured
publicinsured x year1997
household income
(in O.OOOOOO's)
age
educational attainment
(in years)
male
urban
Constant
Sick level
Occupation &enterprises
included
Province dummy
Observations
(1)
care
0.112
(2.92)***
0.133
(1.74)*
-0.241
(2.64)**
-1.425
(0.72)
-0.002
(1 .44)
0.002
(0.85)
-0.043
(1.34)
-0.026
(0.65)
1.023
(5.73)***
yes
yes
yes
783
(2)
sick
0.048
(1. 17)
0.289
(3.67)***
-5.740
(2.67)***
0.001
(1.46)
-0.016
(6.83)***
-0.037
( 1.00)
0.202
(4.75)***
-1.481
(9.67)***
no
yes
yes
13605
(3)
care
0.111
(2.85)***
0.128
(1.64)*
-0.241
(2.59)**
-0.9341
(0.55)
-0.002
(I .44)
0.002
(0.97)
-0.030
(0.74)
-0.030
(0.74)
1.078
(6.06)* **
yes
yes
yes
783
0.205P value of t test for
Estimated P
R squared 0.057
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%;***significant at 1%
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CHAPTER III
PREFERENCE OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENVIRONIVfENTAL
POLlCY COSTS: CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF DISTRIBUTIONAL
PREFERENCE ON PAYMENT VEHICLES
Introduction
In stated preference (SP) studies, the researcher's choice of a payment vehicle
can be a crucial element in obtaining estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) for non-
market environmental goods. Economists would find it convenient if WTP for a public
good could be measured independent of preferences for the manner in which the good is
to be provided. However. the choice of payment vehicle seems to affect estimated WTP
in various ways. For example, respondents' valuations of a good can be quite sensitive
to \vhether periodic or lump sum payment schedules are employed (Stevens et al.. 1997).
A lack of unfamiliarity with the selected payment vehicle can affect the plausibility of
that payment vehicle. and lead to potential payment vehicle bias (Morrison et al., 2000).
Payment mechanisms with differing incentive structures give rise to different contingent
values (Champ et al., 2002). Most importantly, evidence has been widely found that
estimated WTP varies across different payment vehicles. For instance, it has been
deduced from a meta-analysis that the "value of statistical life" depends upon the type
of payment vehicle invoked in the study (de Blaeij et al., 2003). An empirical study of
\vilderness canoeing in Ontario's wilderness parks suggests that WTP is higher when the
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payment vehicle is an increase in the provincial park backcountry permit price. and it is
lower when the payment vehicle is an increase in general trip cost (Rollins, 1997). A
study about protecting the quality of ground water suggests that WT? with a
reallocation of current tax revenues is higher than WT? with a special tax (Bergstrom et
aI., 2004). TogetheL these studies suggest that the chosen payment vehicle can be an
important driver of valuation results (Florax et al., 2005). This undesirable sensitivity of
estimated WTP to different payment vehicles reveals the fact that respondents prefer
some payment vehicles to others.
Respondents' preferences over payment vehicles can play an important role in
managing protest votes. Traditionally. SP researchers have tended to discard protest
votes from the sample. However, this process may result in either an upward or a
downward bias in estimated WTP. Rather than simply ignoring protest votes. recent
studies focus on potential reasons for not voting and methodological strategies for
dealing with protest votes. It has been pointed out that for some instances of protest
responses, voters may object to only one aspect of the CV survey, such as the selected
payment vehicle and its coverage (Jorgensen et ai., 2000). Evidence has been found
which suggests that incorporating respondents' attitudes toward the selected payment
vehicle reduces differences in protest rates across different payment vehicles. and
minimising bias resulting from differences in the coverage of payment vehicles
(Morrison et aI., 2000).
Too few SP surveys ask respondents specifically about their attitudes tovvard
different payment vehicles. In addition, according to Schlapfer's revie'vv of existing SP
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studies. very few SP surveys employ payment mechanisms that are sophisticated
enough to cover various payment vehicles \vith specific cost distributions (Schlapfer,
2006).
The online climate change survey used in this study departs from conventional
SP surveys in that it queries respondents regarding their attitudes toward alternative
payment vehicles. Policy costs in the choice scenario are also described as being borne
in a mixture of ways, with the nature of the mix being defined by a distribution. Most
importantly. the cost share associated with each payment vehicle is randomized as part
of the experimental design of this study. The Existing literature suggests that the
distribution of costs affects respondents' WTP estimates, such that individuals are
inclined to pay more when the cost share paid by polluters increases (Johnson, 2006).
"Polluter-pays" and responsibility issues have been examined in previous studies and
are not the focus of the present study. We are more interested in individuals'
preferences over the distribution of costs among various payment vehicles, when the
general population is required to pay all the cost. In this study, we emphasize that
individuals may playa variety of roles in society, such as individual tax-payers,
consumers, energy-users. and industry investors. Therefore, payment of the domestic
costs is likely to be realized through several payment vehicles simultaneously, including
income tax increases, consumer price increases. energy tax increases, and decreases in
investment returns. We randomly assign a stated cost share for all four of these payment
vehicles. and examine how people's marginal utility differs when the cost share
assigned to each payment vehicle varies. Stated international shares of mitigation costs
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are also randomly assigned for the same research purpose. This aspect of the survey
design allows us to examine the influence on policy choices of respondents' preferences
across payment vehicles (domestically) and different groups of countries
(intemationally).
Due to the fact that stated preference methods are afforded much greater
scrutiny as a tool for benefit-cost analysis (Kahneman et aI., 1992; Diamond et aI.,
1994), researchers endeavor to verify the so-called construct validity of SP estimates in
variety of way s. Sometimes this is done by assessing the correspondence between
averting costs and WTP estimates (Laughland et aI., 1996). Alternately it is sometimes
possible to compare WTP inferences from respondents' expressed voting preference
and estimated WTP (Berrens et aI., 1998), or between WTP estimates obtained from
different elicitation methods (Whitehead et aI., 1998). However, none of the existing
studies concerning payment vehicles uses respondents' preferences over selected
payment vehicles as an underlying criterion to test the construct validity. SP studies
which use respondents' attitudes toward payment vehicles to reduce WTP bias from
protest votes might be more convincing if the researcher can explore respondents'
preferences concerning alternative payment vehicles to ensure that there is a plausible
systematic relationship between stated payment vehicle preferences and stated choice
behavior.
In this chapter, we consider the construct validity of respondents' WTP for
climate change mitigation programs as a flmction of their stated attitudes about who
should be responsible to bear the costs of climate change mitigation programs. The
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findings appear to confirm that respondents' utility levels are higher when they
contemplate a policy that would require a larger share of policy costs to be paid through
their preferred vehicle. Their utility levels are lower when they are asked to pay a larger
cost share via a less-pre felTed payment vebicle. Taken together. these findings suggest
that choices in our climate change survey display a reasonable degree of construct
validity in terms of systematic heterogeneity in WTP that can be traced to respondents'
preference over payment vehicles. These findings should encourage future researchers
to elicit, and take advantage of, respondents' subjective attitudes toward different
payment vehicles. This information may provide a methodological remedy for coping
with understanding "protest votes" that may be more complex than simply a
respondent"s outright rejection of an alternative due to their personal objections to the
payment vehicle.
The rest of chapter is organized as follows: Section II: Available data: the online
climate change survey; Section III: Theoretical Model and Estimating Specification;
Section IV: Results and Discussion; and Section V: Conclusion.
Avail able Data: the Online Climate Change Survey
Our full dataset consists of approximately 2000 responses to a comprehensive
online survey of climate change. This multi-campus analog to a conventional classroom
survey (http://globalpolicysurvey .ucl a.ed u) uses a remotely administered Web-based
questionnaire. Each version of the questionnaire includes one of an extensive array of
stated preference choice experiments designed to measure preferences with respect to
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alternative climate change policies. The design of the questionnaire incorporates an
unusually wide array of dynamically generated randomized elicitation formats that
permit assessment of the sensitivity of choices to different elicitation strategies. On the
surface, these different elicitation formats may appear to be arbitrary and
inconsequential, but empirically, they may have a systematic effect upon choices. The
sample used here consists primarily of college students-recruited by 114 different
instructors from classes at 92 different colleges and universities throughout the U.S. and
Canada-who responded to the survey over the internet (Cameron et aI., 2006).
Predicted Impacts of Climate Change
Many scientists have believed that climate change has the potential to pose
major threats to agriculture, weather, human health, and ecosystems (Kinnell et al..
2002; Kelly et aI., 2005; Bosello et aI., 2006; Kurukulasuriya et al., 2006). In addition to
these potential impacts, economists realize that failure to equalize the marginal cost of
preventing climate change (i.e. of curtailing greenhouse gas emissions through
abatement efforts across different sources) may imply a loss of efliciency, which
constitutes another major impact of climate change (Sheeran, 2006). In our survey, we
elicited respondents' subjective concerns about climate change impacts across five
broad categories. We asked: "Bow worried are you about the vulnerability to climate
change of each of the following?" The categories of impacts were described as
"Agriculture and water," "Ecosystems," "Human health," "Oceans and weather." and
"Equity." Respondents' levels of concern regarding each category of impacts can be
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described as one of the alternatives "not worried," "somewhat wonied," "very worried,"
and "don' t know. ,. We also elicited respondents' subjective expected ratings of climate
change impacts: "Worldwide, how do you think climate cbange will afTect each of the
following. by 30 years from now, if a policy of' Business-as-Usual' is followed?"
Respondents were invited to rate climate change impacts as either single values or
intervals on a simple nine-point scale (ranging from -4 for extremely negative impacts,
to +4 for extremely positive impacts). We use the point values or interval midpoints for
these ratings as an approximately continuous measure of anticipated climate change
impacts on each dimension (Cameron et aI., 2006).
Attitudes to\vard Payment Vehicles
Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes about the extent to which
responsibility for the costs of climate change mitigation should be borne by various
potential payors. Six domestic payors were proposed, including individual tax-payers,
consumers, energy users, industry (investors), energy producers, and "government."
While respondents might not recognize themselves as "government," or as direct or
indirect stakeholders in the financial success of "energy producers," they do play
various possible roles such as tax-payers. consumers, energy users and industry
investors.
Seven possible international payors were also proposed. including the
industrialized countries. the countries of the former Soviet Union, densely popUlated
developing countries like India and China. the United States and its major trading
43
partners, developing countries that are beginning to pollute heavily, the smaller
developing countries, and "countries in proportion to their contribution to the problem."
Respondents' attitudes could be one of the following: "agree strongly," "agree:'
"neutral," "disagree," or "disagree strongly."
Climate Policy Choices
In split samples. either two or three policy alternatives were proposed. When
three alternative policies were proposed, these included Complete Mitigation (eM).
Business-as-Usual (BAU), and Partial Mitigation (PM). The consequences of the
policies were assumed to affect respondents' prior statements of their anticipated
climate change impacts (see part A of section II ). Maximum climate change
prevention~"CompleteMitigation" (CM) is when climate change is essentially
prevented. keeping the climate much as it is today. However substantial costs would be
incurred for this policy. Under a Business-as-Usual (BAU) policy, however, the
respondents' anticipated impacts will be realized, but no additional mitigation costs will
be incurred. Respondent who were presented with three-alternative choice sets also saw
an intermediate option called "Partial Prevention" (PM), where the Business-as-Usual
impacts are scaled back, but not eliminated, and the cost of the policy is lower than
complete mitigation (CM).
Under PM and CM, the overall domestic prevention cost is randomized in terms
of the expected costs that households will have to pay, subject to the constraint that the
cost for PM is always less than that for CM. There is no mitigation cost incurred for
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BAU. We seek to convey to individuals that the initial incidence of climate change
mitigation costs could be felt in a variety of different ways, according to how the policy
is implemented. Domestic costs are experienced through four payment vehicles,
including decreases in investment returns and increases in consumer prices, income
taxes. and energy taxes. The cost shares experienced via each payment vehicle, in
percentage terms, are randomized over the range of 10 to 70%.
The international costs of climate change mitigation, explained separately, are
shared across four subsets of the world's countries: "US and Japan," "other
industrialized countries." "India and China," and "other developing countries."
International costs are not borne by domestic households. Domestic costs are
understood to be one component of a coordinated international climate policy. Each
group of countries needs to pay a certain percentage of the global cost. International
cost shares also range from 10-70% and are completely randomized.
Individuals' Concerns about Climate Change
Individuals' stated levels of concern about climate change may play an
important role in their willingness to incur the costs of prevention. Respondents were
asked to rate their personal priority levels for eleven randomly ordered issues likely to
be of global concern. These issues included preventing climate change, improving food
safety, preventing wars, reducing poverty and hunger, etc. The priority levels the
individual could assign included "very high priority," "high priority," "modest priority'-'
"low priority," "not a priority at all" and "not sure." Collected prior to the individuals'
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stated preferences over climate policy, this information reveals respondents' likely
baseline level of concern about climate change. Finally, among the concluding socio-
demographic questions, respondents were also asked whether they belong to any
environmental groups.
Theoretical Model and Econometric Model
Suppose respondent i sawall three alternative policies: Complete Mitigation,
Partial Mitigation and Business-as-Usual. '5 Respondents' utility of voting for a specific
program) (j= CM, PM, or BAU) can be described as
Where Cj denotes the choice-specific prevention cost that the household will
have to pay per month (in dollars), and Bj denotes the choice-specific expected or
(5)
stated benefits. We assume that U(C)<O.and U'(B»O. The variables DC" (h=1.2.J j ' j J J I
3 or 4) capture the cost shares borne via each of the four domestic payment vehicles, so.
cjL DC jli = 1. The variables IC jQ (g=-c 1,2.3 or 4) capture the cost shares paid by each of
1i=1
-1
the four groups of countries (internationally), where we have LIC j'! = 1.
g~l
The attitudes that respondents have concerning the extent to which different
groups should be held responsible for the costs of climate change prevention. and the
stated cost shares for each group, may interact to infl uence the respondent's vote on the
15 Individuals who selected the "would not vote" option are excluded t!'OIll our analysis.
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proposed program. Suppose a respondent agrees that domestic institution h should pay
the cost ( U, (DC III) > 0 ), his/her marginal utility is expected to increase when the cost
share that h is required to pay increases. On the other hand, suppose respondent i
disagrees that g should pay the cost (V (1C
o
) < 0), his/her marginal utility is expected
1 I"
to decrease when the cost share that g is required to pay increases. These constitute the
main hypotheses to be tested in this chapter.
We use a conditional logit modeL in combination with respondents voting
decisions, to estimate the parameters of equation. Based on the discussion above, the
basic form of utility function associated with policy j for individual i can be specified as
follows:
" [() ]
Vi = aiC/ + (fJIZi) Bi +L tJ/iO +L eJllllaftJIIII; *DC;';
1i=1 11/:::1
+~~[e +~e aft .]*1C 1 +E lL gO L gil gill gl I
g:::::l 11=1
where
V/ denotes the utility under policy j for individual i;
q and Bi denote the individual's choice-specific expected cost and benefits;
Z, is a set of individual characteristics;
DC;'; and lC~; denote the cost shares for domestic payor h and international payor g;
(6)
aft/lilli is the attitudes revealing respondents' attitudes concerning the responsibility over
each of an expanded list of m= 1.... 6 categories of domestic payors.
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Analogously, aUg/l; is the attitudes variable revealing respondents' attitudes concerning
the responsibility over each of an expanded list of n= I, 2, 3... 7 seven international
country groups.
As part of the experimental design of the survey. respondents savv different
numbers of response options in the attitude elicitation questions. Two-alternative
versions only included "agree" and "disagree;" three-alternative-versions added a
"neutral" option; four-alternative versions included "agree strongly" and "disagree
strongli', but dropped "neutral"; five-alternative-versions put "neutral" back in.
To simplify the analysis, we combine "strongly disagree" with the "disagree"
category, and combine "strongly agree" with the "agree" category. Therefore, we have
two possible sets of attitude dummy variables- "agrees" and "disagrees." Including
both "agree" and "disagree" in the one model is not appropriate, because respondents
who savv versions not having "neutral" (eg. the two-alternative version or the four-
alternative version) would then lose their omitted category. Therefore, we consider the
two different sets of attitude dummy variables in separate models, both of which are
based on equation (6). The first model, identified in equation (7) below, uses the
"agrees" version of the attitude dummy variables, implying the omitted category of
"disagrees" or "neutral." The second model, equation (8), uses the "disagrees" version
of the attitude dummy variables, implying the omitted category of "agrees" or "neutral."
(7)
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(8)
The descriptive statistics for the selected choice variables are reported in Table
II. We intend to use the above models to examine whether the direction of the
respondents' utility change is consistent with our theoretical predictions. However,
these models, if they include the whole set of attitude variables, may suffer from
collinearity problems. In auxiliary regressions, where we regress the attitudes toward
each single payor on attitudes toward all other payors, we observe large R 2 values and
individually large t statistics in many cases. The simple pairwise correlation matrix also
suggests that respondents may have systematically related attitudes towards different
types of payors. Rather than including the universe of potential payors from the attitude
questions as shifters on every cost share in the policy choice models, we elect to match
each payor with the most closely related attitudes. The interaction terms between the
cost share of a payment vehicle and the respondents' attitudes toward the responsibility
of each associated payor constitute the set of "construct validity assessment
variables." 16
Figure I describes the way in which we construct the domestic validity
assessment variables. The lett part of Figure I shows the six domestic payor categories,
toward which respondents were asked about their attitudes. Each of the four payment
16 Additionally. the log likelihood hypothesis testing between the restricted model (with only the validity
assessment variables in) and unrestricted models (the original model) suggests that the restricted model
cannot be rejected.
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vehicles on the right was allocated a cost share in the policy choice scenarios. In some
cases, one payment vehicle very likely induces only one payor to pay the cost. For
example, "price increase" would most likely affect "consumers;" "investment return
decrease"' would very possibly hurt "industry investors;" "income tax increase" may
hurt "individual tax payors." In other cases, one payment vehicle on the right induces
multiple possible payors to pay the cost. For example, "energy tax increase" would hurt
not only "energy users," but also "individual tax-payers," and "energy producers'" Vie
connect the matching pairs to illustrate our a priori associations.
Figure 2 explains the way in which we construct the international validity
assessment variables. "US and Japan" maps most closely to "US and its major trading
partners,"' and "India and China" matches "Densely populated developing countries,
like India and China." However, the other two payment vehicles may not perfectly
match any individual payor category on the left. "Other industrialized countries" may
describe "Industrialized countries" excluding US and Japan, and "Other developing
countries" describes "Developing countries" excluding India and China. We associate
each of these cost shares with their most closely related payor categories. As in the
domestic case, we connect these possible pairs, including the closely matched (solid
lines) and somewhat-matched ones (dash lines). These correspondences define our
international construct validity assessment variables. Due to imperfect matching, \\e
foresee that the somewhat-matching pairs may not exhibit as strong an effect as other
validity assessment variables.
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In the most general possible model, the potential benefit of each policy ( Bj )
should comprise five categories of anticipated impacts, including agriculture and water,
oceans and weather, human health. ecosystems. and equity. However, in our case, the
responses concerning anticipated impacts on human health and oceans/weather are very
different from the other three categories. For these two categories, nearly 70 percent of
the respondents rated the "human health" impacts under BAU as -4, about the same
percentage of people rated the "oceans and weather" impacts as -4 (Table A.3). In
addition, responses for these two categories were all concentrated on the far negative
side of the rating scale. Compared to the other three categories, these two categories,
with little variability across responses, may reflect respondents' tendencies to rank these
t\VO types or impacts as "worst" relative to the other. about which they are less
concerned. Since these two ratings display little variability across respondents, we use
an indicator variable for "all other benefits" associated with "Complete Mitigation" and
a further indicator associated with "Partial Mitigation." These two variables will capture
all net benefits not appearing specifically in our model.
The con-elations within the rest of the impacts ("'agriculture," "ecosystems" and
"equity") cannot be overlooked. especially the ones between ecosystems and agriculture
(Table AA). The correlations among these anticipated impacts preclude putting them all
in one model. To avoid the collinearity, we decide to rotate through the three specific
categories of anticipated impacts in separate models.
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Estimation Results
The parsimonious form of estimation results for equation (7) is reported in Table
12. To facilitate, we use symbols "+" and "-" to denote positive and negative
coefficients respectively. Complete results are contained in Tables A.5 and A.6. The
level of significance is marked by the number of"*," where .,***" denotes significant at
1%, ,.* *" denotes significant at 5%, and "*" denotes significant at I0%. We employ
nine different specifications to check the robustness of our results. The first three
columns (Models 1a, Iband 1c) use respondents' anticipated impacts on agriculture to
represent the potential consequences of a policy, the next three columns (Models 2a, 2b
and 2c) and the last three columns (Models 3a, 3b and 3c) employ the impacts on
ecosystems and equity. respectively. Type (a), (b) and (c) differ in the individual
characteristics used as control variables (by interacting them \vith choice specific
variables).
For the validity assessment variables, we expect people who specifically agree
that a particular payor should pay the cost will derive higher utility when a program
requires a larger cost share from that payor. Therefore, the signs of these validity
assessment variables are expected to be positive. In this table, we retain only these
validity assessment variables that are significant in at least one of these models, at 10%
signi ficance level.
Interestingly, the significant coefficients are all positive, and these results are
robust across all nine different specifications. The domestic validity assessment
variables suggest that if respondents agree that "Energy User." "Individual Taxpayer,"
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or "Industry Investors" should pay the cost, their marginal utility is higher, the greater
the cost share borne as increases in energy tax, increase in income taxes, or decreases in
investment returns, respectively. Our international validity assessment variables suggest
that respondents who agree that US and its trading partners, or India and China. should
pay the cost, derive a higher utility when the cost share from US and Japan or India and
China is greater, respectively. Other coefficients of validity variables, although not
significant, are positive with very few exceptions (Table A.5). Occasional negative
signs associated with some insignificant coefficients may reflect the imperfect matches
between attitudes and cost shares. The fact that all significant validity assessment
.'
variables are positive is evidence of construct validity in terms of respondents'
distributional preferences. 17
Table A.5 reports the extensive form of the conditionallogit choice models. It is
suggested in all nine specifications that people derive less utility from a program
requiring higher household cost, which is consistent with intuition. Besides the
construct validity assessment variables, other attitude-based interaction terms also
deserve our attention. We use the symbol "~" to denote all attitude-based interaction
terms in this table. For the benefit (avoided impacts) variables, it is suggested that
people derive greater utility from preventing a severely impacts of climate change. In
addition, respondents who were worried about a paJ1icular impact (Type A), or those
\vho were high informed about environment (Type B), derive greater utility from a
program to avoid severely or moderately bad impacts than their counterparts did. For
17 Under stepwise clogit estimation, the statistically significant coefficients of the construct validity
assessment variables remain significant when we drop the insignificant ones. We also ran a model that
has all three categories of impacts included. the signs of the significant coefficients remain unchanged.
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the elicitation format variables, all nine specifications commonly suggest that an
individuars marginal utility was higher when voting for PM than for BAU and CI'v1.
Individuals who saw PM conveyed a higher utility from CM than those who did not.
Type (C) models suggest that respondents who thought climate change \vas a high
priorities among global policy issues or those who belong to at least one environment
group, derive a higher utility from CM. On the other hane!. respondents who considered
climate change as low priority derive less utility from complete mitigation. These
findings are consistent with our expectations. Although not the primary focus of this
study, these findings additionally support construct validity for the online climate
change survey.
The extensive form of our conditionallogit models using the attitudes
characterization "disagrees" is reported in Tables A.6. Specifications in the models
using the "disagrees" dummies follO\v the same ordering as those \\'hich use the
"agrees" dummies. Estimation results described in Table A.6 additionally support
construct validity: respondents who disagreed that a particular group payor should bear
the cost derive a lower utility when the cost share from that payor is larger. Other
attitude-based construct validity variables exhibit similar variations to those in Table
A.S.
Conclusion
In this study, we assess the construct validity of climate change mitigation
policy preferences elicited using an online survey. We do this by testing the logical
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consistency between respondents' subjective attitudes concerning the responsibility of
various groups of payors and the survey's stated cost distributions among selected
payors. The key finding suggests that respondents are likely to derive higher utility from
a policy that requires a larger share of the costs to be borne via their most-preferred type
of payment vehicle, and a lovver utility from a policy requiring a larger cost share to be
borne via their less-preferred payment vehicle. Additional evidence is also consistent
with theoretical predictions. Taken together, these findings support the construct
validity of this climate change survey in terms of respondents' distributional
preferences over payment vehicles.
Previous literature has shown that respondents' attitudes toward payment
vehicles may play an important role in managing protest votes resulting from objections
to the chosen payment vehicles. Attention to these attitudes may reduce the bias of
WTP estimates. The current study provides evidence that respondents' attitudes toward
different possible payment vehicles can have a statistically significant effect on their
stated policy preferences in our online climate change survey. This research strongly
suggests that future stated preference studies should recognize that respondents'
attitudes toward payment vehicles can have an important and systematic influence upon
their stated policy choices. Thus researchers may be ill-advised to use just a single
payment vehicle and to presume that policy preferences (and the implied willingness to
pay for public goods) are independent of this aspect of the choice scenario.
Figure I. Construct domestic validity assessment variables
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Domestic payors Domestic payment vehicles
Individual tax-payers
Consumers
Energy producers
Energy users
Industry (investors)
I Government
Energy tax increase
Income tax iricrease
Price increase
Invest return
Figure 2. Construct international validity assessment variables
International payers
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International payers
Industrialized countries I
____------.JI',
The former Soviet Union I
-----
Densely populated developing countrics_ like India and China
US and its major trading pal-tner
De\cloping countries that al·e beginning to pollute heavily
Smaller developing countries
Countries in propoliion to their contribution to the problem
US and .lapan
Other industrialized
countries
India and China
- Other dneloping
- countries
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for selected variables
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Variables
A. Randomized choice scenarios:
Expected policy cost ($ 'OOO/year)
a.)Domesric cost shares (%)
Increased prices
Increased energy taxes
Increased income taxes
Decreased investment returns
b.)International cost shares (%)
US and Japan
Other ind ustrial ized countries
India and China
Other developing countries
B. Respondents' attitudes:
1. Costs:
a.)Domestic re.\ponsibili(vlor costs?
Consumers
Industry (investors)
Individual taxpayers
Energy users
Government
Energy producers
b.) Int'/ responsibility/or costs?
Industrialized countries
Former Soviet Union
Densely pop. Dev. India China
US and major trade partners
Smaller dev. Countries
Countries in prop. to contribution
2. Benefits (avoided climate change
impacts):
Agriculture, Water
Ecosystems
Human Health
Complete Mitigation Partial Mitigation
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
3.11 0.98 1.56 1.66
24.77 16.00 25.30 16.35
25.40 15.90 24.49 16.24
24.60 16.02 25.63 15.93
25.20 16.14 24.58 15.83
24.66 15.92 24.74 16.05
25.61 16.50 24.41 15.38
24.80 15.96 24.34 15.57
24.92 16.07 26.51 16.95
1(agree)" 1(disagree) b
0.688 0.166
0.849 0.078
0.432 0.078
0.810 0.087
0.799 0.010
0.863 0.064
1(agree) I (d isagree)
0.582 0.264
0.431 0.318
0.597 0.233
0.747 0.13\
0.513 0.513
0.881 0.064
I(severe) I(moderate)
0.275 0.603
0.438 0.505
0.991 0.012
"The I(agree) indicator distinguishes "agrees" from "neutral or disagl'ees"
b The I(d isagree) ind icator distingu ishes "d isagrees" f"om "neutral or agrees"
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Table 11. (Continued)
Oceans. Weather 0.988 0.015
Equity, Fairness 0.204 0.528
3. Re5Jwndent indil'idua!
characteristics:
0) IVorrv: \'u!IJcrabilitv to climate
1(worried) C l(no\)"change
Agriculture, Water 0.618 0.186
Ecosystems 0.617 0.189
I-Iuman Health 0.550 0.259
Oceans, Weather 0.464 0.313
Equity, Fairness 0.363 0.348
b.) Concerns about climate change& l(high)d 1(low) b
cnl'iro.
Climate change high priority 0.445 0.315
1(high)" 1(low) C
Well-informed about enviro. issues 0.302 0.171
I(yes) I(no)
Belongs to enviro. group/s 0.248 0.752
a The 1(worried) indicator sign ifies either "extremely worried" or "very worried," while the I(not)
indicator signifies "not too worried" or "not worried at all." The omitted category is "somewhat worried"
or "don't know."
b The 1(high) ind icator signi fies "very high priority" or "high priority," whi Ie the J (low) indicator
signifies "low priority" or "not a priority at all." The omitted category is "model'ate priority" or "not
sure"
C The I(high informed) indicator and the I(low informed) indicatol's are defined relative to the statement
,,[ consider myselfwell-informed about environmental issues:' where the answer options are "agree,"
"disagree," and the omitted category is "neutral."
Table 12. Main results of conditionallogit choice models using the attitudes characterization "agrees" (versus
omitted category consisting of '"disagree" or "neutral"): "+" denotes a positive coefficient and "-" denotes a
negative coefficient: ***significant at 1%: **significant at 5%: significant at 10%
X=Agriculture. Water X=Ecosystems impacts X=Equity. Fairness
impacts only only impacts only
(1 a) (lb) (~(2a) (2b) (2c): (3a) (3b) (3c)
Domestic volldll\' ussessmenl \'ur/uhles
Increased energy taxes
* 1(Agree U:::nel'gyusers
Increased income taxes
* 1(AgreeLTaxpaycrs
Decreased investment returns
* l(Agree)_lndustry
[mernalfonal validilv assessmenl variables
India and ('him
* l(Agl'ce)_lndiaCillna
US and Jupan
* 1(AgreeLUSJupan
Program cost
Anlieipated climole change impacls
(baseline)
1(severely had impact on X)
*1(worried ahow the impact on X)
. * I(high informed)
FJieitallon/ormats included (huseline!
1(partial mitigation)
l(complete mitigation)
*l(saw partial mitigation)
*l(clilllate a high priority')
. * l(clilllate a low priority)
*1(Belongs to enviro. Group/s1
Cost shares (baseline) included
Observations
~**
;.**
+**
1-**
+***
*8*
yes
***
yes
-***
+***
yes
4235
.*
+*
+**
1-**
+***
***
."es
***
**
.J'es
***
...j...***
.res
4235
.* !.** 1** +** ~** *
.-* +** +** +* ;** 1*
+** +** +** +** t-** ';**
**
;.-** +** +** +** t**
+** ~** +** +* j.*** 1***
*** *** *** "'** *** ***
ves ves ves VI'S ves )Jf'S
*** ** *** ** * ***
**
**
"!<"'-
\'1'.1' \'eS lies ,'es H:'S ,"e.\"
* >i: ,-" * '!: ~
*** *** ***
\:;;< '*'
+*** +*** -:--*** +*** .1. >I;: *' * ---J..*~*
;.j.: .". ,~
***
*;.!;'!'
***
*** t **' *
VI'S J'es yes yes 1'1'.1' yes
4203 4235 4235 4203 4235 4235
,*
+**
t·**
+**
***
.\'(:!S
***'
\'(:,S
I ~;<
***
>;<**
***
***
yes
4203
V,
'-D
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CHAPTER IV
ORDER EFFECTS ON WTP VIA THE PRIOR ELICITATION OF
ATTITUDES IN STATED PREFERENCE SURVEYS
Introduction
In stated preference (SP) surveys, order efTects occur when responses to a given
question vary in a theoretically unexpected manner due to the positioning of that
question or item relative to others (Powe et al., 2003). A number of SP studies find that
a good's placement in a sequence of goods in valuation questions has a substantial
impact on people's valuation of this particular good (Carson et al., 1998; Dupont, 2003;
Powe et al., 2003). Goods are likely to evoke higher values if they appear earlier in a
sequence (Payne et al., 2000; Veisten et aL 2004).18
However, these studies focus on order effects in a quite limited sense. In
addition to the order of valuation questions, the order of preamble questions may also
lead to theoretically unanticipated responses, as has been suggested in the physiology or
survey literatures (Carpenter et al., 1979; Crespi et aL 1984; Bishop et aL 1985;
Krosnick et al., 1987; Mitchell et al., 1989; Colasanto et al., 1992; Dillman, 2000;
18 Order effects were sometimes referred to as "embedding effects" (Boyle et aI., 1993). The term
"embedding" stems from Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), where they use the term to describe a wide
variety of nesting and sequencing issues (Dupont, 2003). Since the term has been applied to distinct
phenomena. it is ill-defined (Kahneman et aI., 1992; Loom is et aI., 1993). Hanemann provides a useful
categorization of three different effects that have been associated with embedding, including the
sequencing effect (order effect), the scope effect and the sub-additivity effect (Carson et aI., 1995). The
embedding effects describe the limited sense of order effects in a way that WTP varies with the
placement of a good in a sequence of goods.
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Tourangeau et aI., 2000; Bishop et aI., 2001; Moore. 2002). These studies document a
considerable amount of evidence that order effects are prevalent in surveys. However,
due to the non-economic nature of these studies, they provide few implications about
potential order effects in the val uation of public goods via stated preference surveys.
Among economic studies, in contrast to the substantial number of studies
investigating order effects in valuation questions themselves (i.e. a good's placement in
a sequence of goods to be valued), the empirical literature is remarkably thin concerning
order effects which stem from the order of presentation of the preliminary information
given to respondents, prior to any choice exercises. The problem can be ignored if
respondents' inherent attitudes toward the good are not vulnerable to being swayed by
information ordering. However, the effects cannot be overlooked if respondents adjust
their opinions in response to the ways in which prior attitude-elicitation questions were
ordered. These changes might further affect their choices in the stated preference
portion of the survey and thus lead to biased WTP estimates.
To our knowledge, only the paper by Boyle et al. (1993) has explored these
distinct types of order effects. Using a contingent valuation survey concerning Grand
Canyon white-water boating, they find that the ordering of the prior elicitation questions
does matter to the valuation of public goods, and inexperienced boaters are more
susceptible to ordering effects than experienced boaters. 19 The scarcity of order-effects
19 Their work indicates that experience and familiarity about the environmental goods in question play an
important role in reducing order effects. In the broader survey literature. a considerable amount of
evidence has also been found that the magnitude of order effects also differs by other individual
characteristics, such as age, and education (Hanemann. 1994: Dupont. 2003), and types of users (active.
potentially active and passive users) (Knauper, 1999)
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studies in a valuation context means that economic non-market valuation research lags
behind non-economic social science research in this area.
Using an online climate change survey, the present study identifies order effects
stemming from prior elicitation questions, and examines the potential economic
consequences of these effects. Our results suggest that the ordering of information in
these preamble questions may alter people's attitudes toward various attributes of the
goods, and thus affect the estimated WTP amount derived in the survey. This chapter is
arranged as follows: Section II describes our available data from the existing online
climate change survey; Section III reviews some preliminary scoping models; Section
IV discusses our main empirical models to assess the impacts of order effects on policy
choices, and Section V itemizes our empirical findings: Section VI considers the
implications of order effects for simulated WTP amounts. and Section VII concludes.
Available Data: The Online Climate Change Survey
Our full dataset consists of approximately 2000 responses to a comprehensive
online survey of climate change. The sample used here consists primarily of college
students-recruited by 114 different instructors from classes at 92 different colleges and
universities throughout the U.S. and Canada-who responded to the survey over the
internet. This is a multi-campus analog to a conventional classroom survey
(http://globalpolicysurvey.ucla.edu) which uses a remotely administered Web-based
questionnaire. Each dynamically generated questionnaire includes one of an extensive
array of stated preference choice experiments designed to measure preferences with
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respect to alternative climate change policies in the form of willingness to incur the
potential costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The design of the
questionnaire also incorporates an unusually wide range of dynamically generated
randomized elicitation formats for other information that permits assessment ofthe
sensitivity of respondents' choices to different elicitation strategies (Cameron et aI.,
2006). On the surface, these different elicitation formats may appear to be arbitrary and
inconsequential. Empirically, however, order effects may have a systematic effect upon
choices.2o
Prior Elicitation Questions
Five Categories of Climate Change Impacts
Many scientists believe that climate change has the potential to pose major
threats to agriculture, weather, human health, and ecosystems (Kinnell et aI., 2002;
Kelly et aI., 2005; Bosello et a!., 2006; Kuruku lasuriya et aI., 2006). In addition to these
potential impacts, economists realize that failure to equalize the marginal cost of
preventing cl imate change (i.e. of curtail ing greenhouse gas emissions through
abatement efforts across different sources) may imply a loss of efficiency, and this
constitutes another major impact of cl imate change (Sheeran, 2006).
In our survey, we elicit respondents' subjective levels of concern about climate
change impacts across five broad categories, including "Agriculture and water,"
2(> Most such survey involve just a single format for all questionnaires. However, it is impossible to know
the extent of order effects unless orderings are varied across questionnaires.
64
"Ecosystems," "Human health," "Oceans and weather," and "Equity." Respondents'
levels of concern regard ing each category of impacts are categorized as "not worried,"
"somewhat worried," "very worried," and "don't know". We also elicit respondents'
subjective expected ratings of the likely magnitudes of climate change impacts for each
of the five categories, by thirty years from now, if a policy of "Business-as-Usual" is
followed. Respondents are invited to rate climate change impacts either as single values
or as intervals on a simple nine-point scale (ranging from -4 for extremely negative
impacts, to +4 for extremely positive impacts). In this chapter. we use the point values
(or interval midpoints) for these ratings as an approximately continuous measure of
anticipated climate change impacts on each of the five dimensions (Cameron et aI.,
2006)?1
Attitudes toward Various Payment Vehicles
Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes aboLlt the extent to which
responsibility for the costs of climate change mitigation should be borne by various
groups. Six domestic groups were proposed and randomly ordered, including individual
taxpayers, consumers, energy users, industry (investors), energy producers, and
government. Seven international country groups as possible payors were also proposed
and randomly ordered. These include industrialized countries, the countries of the
"I The orderings of the five categories of impacts are constant throughout the survey for anyone
respondent, but are randomized across respondents (except "equity", which is always placed at the end).
In addition, we find that the orderings of the five categories affect both respondents' level of concern and
their expected ratings of impacts. Therefore, it is possible that the ordering ofthese five categories might
affect policy choices via two different avenues: I. by affecting their level of concern; 2. by affecting their
rating of expected climate change impacts.
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former Soviet Union, densely populated developing countries like India and China, the
United States and its major trading partners, developing countries that are beginning to
pollute heavily, smaller developing countries, and "countries in proportion to their
contribution to the problem." Responses concerning the extent to which each payor
should be responsible for bearing the costs of preventing climate change could be one of
the following: "agree strongly," "agree," "neutral," "disagree," or "disagree strongly."
Responses to these questions about responsibility and the position of each group in its
respective list are summarized in Table 13. The 1(agree) indicator distinguishes "agree"
from "neutral" or "disagree", while the I(disagree) indicator distinguishes "disagree"
from "neutral" or "agree".
Individuals' Concern about Various Issues Including Climate Change
Individuals' stated levels of concern about climate change may play an
important role in their willingness to incur the costs of prevention. Respondents were
asked to rate their personal priority levels for eleven randomly ordered issues likely to
be of global concern. These issues included preventing climate change, improving food
safety, preventing wars, reducing poverty and hunger, etc. Across respondents, the order
of these issues is completely shuffled, and these orders are also summarized in Table 13.
The responses individuals could give included "very high priority," "high priority,"
"moderate priority," "low priority," "not a priority at all" and "not sure." The 1(high)
indicator signifies "very high priority" or "high priority"; while the l(low) indicator
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signifies "low priority" or "not a priority at all." The omitted category is the union of
"moderate priority" or "not sure."
Policy Alternatives
In split samples, either two or three policy alternatives were proposed. When
three alternative policies were proposed, these included Complete Mitigation (CM),
Business-as-Usual (BAU), and Partial Mitigation (PM). When two alternative policies
were proposed, these included just CM and BAU. Maximum climate change
prevention-"Complete Mitigation" (CM) is when climate change is essentially
prevented, keeping the climate much as it is today. However substantial costs would be
incurred for this policy. Under a Business-as-Usual (BAU) policy, however, the
respondent's anticipated impacts will be realized, but no additional mitigation costs will
be incurred. Respondent who were presented with three-alternative choice sets also saw
an intermediate option called "Partial Prevention" (PM), where the Business-as-Usual
impacts are scaled back, but not eliminated and the cost ofthe policy is lower than for
complete mitigation (CM)22.
Under PM and CM, overall domestic prevention costs are randomized in terms
of the expected costs that the respondent's household will have to pay, subject to the
constraint that the cost for PM is always less than that for CM. There is no mitigation
cost incurred for BAU. Policy costs are therefore uncorrelated with any other policy
22 These policies were aITanged in two ways: either BAll is on the left or otherwise. The orderings of these policies
are shown not to affect their voting decisions. Resu Its are available fi'om the authors.
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attributes, including the respondent's anticipated BAU climate change impacts and any
other respondent's attributes.
We also seek to convey to individuals that the initial incidence of climate
change mitigation costs could be felt in a variety of different \vays. according to how
the policy is implemented. Domestic costs are described as being experienced through
four different "payment vehicles" including increases in consumer prices, income taxes,
energy taxes. and decreases in investment returns. The cost shares experienced via each
type of payment vehicle, in percentage terms, are randomized over the range of 10 to
70%. Thus, these policy attributes are, by design. uncorrelated with any other program
features or respondent characteristics.
The international costs of climate change mitigation. explained separately. are
shared across four subsets of the world's countries: "US and Japan," "other
industrialized countries," "India and China," and "other developing countries."
Domestic costs are one component of a more-or-less coordinated international climate
policy. In any given policy scenario, each group of countries needs to contribute a
certain percentage of the global cost. International cost shares are also randomized over
the range of 10-70%. and are likewise uncorrelated with other policy attributes and
respondents' characteristics.
Preliminary Models: Attitudes as a Function of Position
Table 13 summarizes responses as well as the positions of questions for which
the questions were randomly ordered. In this part of our analysis, we investigate how
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the relative position of a question affects responses. Note that if order effects do indeed
exist, these responses may vary not only with the placement of the particular question,
but also with other questions on the list which may provide more background
information (i.e. create a different context) and lead the respondent to rethink his or her
attitudes, either consciously or unconsciously. This behavior can be referred to as a
"context effect" (Colasanto et a!., 1992).
To reveal how a category's position in the list affects stated attitudes, we
estimate some simple probit models, where each "attitude" is converted into a binary
indicator and used as the dependent variable. We use a probit model to explain
respondent i's attitude about each global policy problem, and each group's
responsibility to bear the costs of climate change mitigation. Generically. these models
can be specified as follows:
III
ATTITUDE' = a +~ jJPOSITION. + jJZ + E:
I I J I I I
}=I
ATTITUDE," is a latent variable capturing the respondent's propensity to rate
the global policy problem as a high priority, or his/her propensity to agree with the
responsibility of the group in question to bear the costs of climate change mitigation.
(9)
POSITION} is a simple integer variable which denotes the position in the relevant list
of global policy problem j or payor group j (where a value of I indicates the first
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position and higher values indicate that the item was further down the list). The vector
Z, includes a selection of respondent characteristics as summarized in Table A.7.23
Table A.8 reveals evidence of order effects in respondents' answers to the
question concerning the extent to which climate change is a policy priority. "Preventing
wars" is the omitted category. The positions of three different global policy problem.
relative to the position of "preventing wars," appear to have a significant effect on
responses. Most importantly, when "preventing climate change" is placed higher on the
list (i.e. when its "position" takes on a smaller value), respondents are more likely to
indicate that climate change is a high policy priority for them (indicated in bold). This
result is hardly surprising. In addition, climate change is also likely to be rated as a high
policy priority when "improving food safety" and "improving education" are placed
more highly compared to the omitted category "preventing vvars." Note also that the
climate change priority questions were asked very near the beginning of the survey,
unlike the cost responsibility questions, which were asked close to the policy choice
task later in the survey. Order effects from the initial global policy priority question
may subside during the course of the survey, especially since it became apparent to
respondents after the initial "global policy question" that this particular survey would be
entirely about climate change.
23 Each characteristic enters in a simple linear additive form as a control: the slope coefficients on these
variables are not reported here. Results are available from the authors. Note, however. that since the
positions in each of the three lists were randomly assigned, there should be no correlation between any of
the position variables and any individual characteristics, and thus no omitted variables bias if these
controls are omitted.
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Table A.9 presents the results of analogous probit models to explain
respondents' propensity to agree \'v'ith assertions about the responsibility of difIerent
categories of domestic payors to bear the costs of climate change mitigation. Six
models are shown, since we are interested in order efIects on each rating (a key to the
categories ofpayors is included at the bottom of the table).24 Many coefficients are
significant, which suggest the evidence of order effects. The "own-efIects" are indicated
in bold. The statistically significant "own-effects" coefficients suggest that an earlier
placement makes respondents more likely to "agree" this payor's responsibility. For
instance, an earlier placement of "industry" increases the chance that the respondent
will "agree" that industry should be responsible for paying the cost of climate change
mitigation: an earlier placement of "taxpayers" increase the probability that the
individual would "agree" income taxpayers paying the cost.
Finally, in Table A.I 0, we consider the position efIects on the propensity of
respondents to agree with the responsibility of each of a number of international country
groups to bear the cost of climate change mitigation. A number of position variables of
international payment vehicles can be seen to have significant effects on attitudes. For
instance, a latter position for "industrialized countries" makes respondents more likely
to "agree" US and its major trade partner bear the cost: a latter placement of "densely
populated countries, like India or China" makes respondents more likely to "agree"
these countries should bear the COSt.25
2~ One must remember that one of the positions is completely defined once the other positions are set (i.e.
"government" is the left-aLit calegory).
25 In Table A.4, "smaller developing countries" is the left-out calegory).
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The preliminary probit estimation results reported in Tables A.2-4 indicate that
arbitrary questions orderings, usually considered to be innocuous (and often an
overlooked element of most surveys), can sometimes have statistically significant
impacts on responses. Why these order effects exist in the form that they do is a
complex question, more in the purview of psychological research. The researcher's
decision about the ordering of information in a survey could have negligible effects on
the attitudes elicited from respondents if these respondents choose climate change
policies based upon their own prior opinions \vhich have not been affected by the
ordering effects. However, if respondents choose among policy options based upon
attitudes or opinions that have been manipulated (either intentionally or unintentionally)
by the framing of attitude questions, these ordering effects became an inconvenient
factor that could potentially lead to biased WTP estimates.
Cai et aL (2007) examine whether people's choices among climate policy
options are correlated with their prior responses to attitudinal questions. 26 Table A.II
briefly summarizes the findings from that study. If a respondent agrees that a particular
group should bear the costs of mitigation, his/her utility is higher when this group is
required to pay a larger share of the costs. If a respondent personally thinks climate
change is a high priority, he/she derives greater utility from a policy of complete
mitigation. These results suggest that respondents make their stated policy choices
based in part upon the attitudes elicited in the survey's preamble questions. Thus, it is
26 Estimation t'esults are available from the authors.
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very likely that order effects might influence people's policy voting decisions, and
therefore lead to distortions in predicted WTP amounts.
Empirical Models: The Impacts of Order Effects on Policy Choices
In this section, we outline our basic models for climate policy choices which
permit us to examine how a researcher, through an arbitrary single ordering of
preliminary elicitation questions, might unwittingly affect policy choices and thus
estimated WTP. Suppose respondent i sees all three alternative policies: CM, PM, and
BAU. 27 This respondent's anticipated indirect utility under policy} (where)= CM, PM,
or BAU) can be described generically as
where (Y; - Cn denotes the choice-specific net income (after any mitigation
costs) that the respondent's household will enjoy under policy} . The variables
DCh (h=1, 2, 3 or 4) capture the choice scenario's stated initial incidence of
domestic costs under policy} (measured by the cost shares borne via each of
4
the four different payment vehicles, so thatI DCh = 1). The variables IC;
!I~I
(g=1. 2, 3 or 4) capture the international distribution of climate change
mitigation costs (measured by the stated cost shares borne by each of the four
27 Incli\iduals who sclcctcd thc "would not volC" option arc cxcludcd II'om our analysis. A mOI"e-complex
econometric spccification is requil'ed lo accommodate this additional typc of"rcsponsc" to the choicc question.
4groups of countries, so that I IC: = I ).28 The variable Bi denotes the choice-
g:::1
specific subjective expected benefits (i.e. the avoided climate change impacts),
and Program i allows for individuals to derive a systematically higher or lower
level of utility simply for choosing eM or PM. rather than BAll, independent
of the specific attributes of the policy.
Now we can consider how to introduce heterogeneity into the preference
function. Let ATTITUDE _ m; and ATTITUDE _ 11; be the attitudes concerning
responsibility to bear the costs of climate change mitigation (for domestic and
international payors, respectively). Let ATTITUDE _ p: be the degree of
priority that the respondent assigns to climate change as a policy problem. The
indirect utility conveyed through complete mitigation could be generalized as
follovvs:
V' CM =(X (Y _CCM )+ ~l(i + ~(i ATTITUDE I71]DCCM
I I I I ~ "0 ~ /111/ - I III
"~I m~1
I tl0;" I to,,,ATTITUD£ _n}c;,w I jJ,l{'"
[
" ] 0/ (.vi
+ fJ20 + fJ21 ATTITUDE _Pi program;' +E;' (10)
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However, we have established that lhese attitudinal variables can be
explained in part by the arbitrary positions of specific topics in the preliminary
questions. Instead of modeling ~*CM as a function of attitudes, we will examine
"reduced form" models where indirect utility from climate change policies is
28 For each set of shares, only three of the four shares will be independent.
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allowed to vary directly with the position of relevant topics 111 the relevant
preamble questions. Specifically:
V*lM = a (Y - elM) + ~[e +~ e POSITION I71] DClA-/
I I· I I L...J 11 0 L...J /1111 _ I III
/,~I 11/=1
+t[Oe, +to,,,POS1TION _n}c;,M + fI,R,','"
(ll)
The POSITION _ m; variables describe the ordering of the preliminary attitude
questions concerning the responsibility for climate change mitigation costs for each of
m =1, ... ,6 categories of domestic payors; the POSITION _ n; variables are analogous,
but they instead record the ordering of the preliminary attitude questions concerning the
responsibility over each of an expanded list of n = I, 2, 3 ... 7 international country
groups. POSITION _ Pi describes the ordering of global issues in the preliminary
question concerning policy priorities P = I.... , II.
For the partial mitigation alternative, when it is offered, the indirect utility
function is given analogously by:
v,.PM =al(Y;-CiPM )+ t[ehO + Ie/III/POSITION _Jni]DC2\1
h=1 II/~I
+~[e +~ e POSITION n]IC!'\1 + 13 BPI/L...J gO L...J gil - I gf I I,
g;::;:1 n=1
+[1320 + 1321 POSITION _p;]program{AI +E,PM (l2)
Finally. under the status quo alternative (BAU), the individual will bear no costs
and in this case there will be no concerns about the distribution of these costs, either
75
domesticallv or international!v. Thus we will have CDAL = 0, and all of the cost shares
. . ,
(implicitly interacted with a dummy variable for the presence of any mitigation costs)
will be zero. LikeVv·ise. there \vill be no benefits (i.e. no "impact reductions") so we will
have BLJ!L = 0 for the explicit benefits. and PM lJAU = CM BAU = 0 for the alternative-
I ~ I I
specific dummy variables that we use to capture the implicit benefits of each policy
alternative. Only the income term remains relevant, so that
V'IUl = (X (Y)+t:B;/U
/ I I I (13 )
For random utility models (RUMs), it is customary to allow the indirect utility
difference, relative to a numeraire alternative (here, the BAU alternative) to drive
respondent's choices among the available alternatives. In our context, there are two such
utility differences. The first is for complete mitigation versus business-as-usuaI: 29
~ "', (-C,' ")+t [e"o +~ e,,,,,POSn10N ~~ m, :1 DC,:"
+~..j [e. +~ e POSITION n1IC"H + 13 E'M?o gJ/ ~ / gl I \/
2"=1 //=1
+ [1310 + 1311POSITION _ Pi] *(1) + (t:i M _ t:,BAU)
Similarly the indirect utility-difference for the partial mitigation alternative is:
f..V'P+' = (V'PM _ V*B.'IL)
, , ,
4 [() ]
= (X, (-CiP\!) +Be"o +~ e'I/I/POSITION _ m, DC:';-"
+~[e," + ~e,,,POSITION _n}C;'M + fJ,B,;M
19 .. program" is I for both eM and PM.
(14)
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For the business-as-usual (numeraire) alternative. of course, this indirect utility-
difference is simply zero.
( 15)
To estimate the basic marginal utility parameters for this model, as well as the
key coefficients identifying order effects (i.e. e!JIJ,' egl/' and /321 ), one typically employs
some variant of a conditional logit estimator. Variations across individuals, and across
alternatives for each individuaL in the variables in equation (6) and (7) permit the
marginal utility parameters and shift coefficients to be estimated. The systematic
portions of the indirect uti lity functions in these two expressions are commonly known
as the "index" for the discrete choice problem, where the value of the index for the
numeraire alternative is zero.
If we represent the systematic portions of these indirect utility-differences generically
as r I w,J , since they are linear-in-parameters, the conditionallogit probabilities
associated with choosing each alternative, in the three-alternative context, can be
expressed as:
. exp(r'W.CM )
pCM = I
I exp(r I w,CM) + exp(r I w,PM) + 1
( 'WPM)pPM = exp r i
I exp(r I w,CM) + exp(r' T-Y,PM) + 1
pBriU = 1
/ exp(r I w,CM) + exp(y I w,P:\1) + 1
(] 6)
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The log-likelihood function to be maximized \,vith respect to the unknown parameters is
then
log L = ",A [/'M 10 (pCM)+ vF'/loJ(PI"/)+ VBAL 10 (pBAL')J'
- L...,/~I - / g I . I g, . I g I (17)
Where the .r,' indicators take on the value of I if alternative j is chosen and zero
otherwise.
Estimation Results
In the most general possible model, the potential benefit of each policy (Bi )
should comprise all five available categories of anticipated impacts, including
Agriculture&Water, Oceans&Weather, HumanHealth. Ecosystems, and Equity. In our
data. however, respondents' anticipated impacts on HumanHealth and Oceans&Weather
are distributed very differently from the other three categories. Nearly 70 percent of the
respondents rated the HumanHealth impacts under business-as-usual -4, about the same
percentage of people rated the Oceans&Weather impacts as -4. Virtually 99% of
respondents rated the HumanHealth and Oceans&Weather impacts as "severe" (i.e.
either -3 or -4), so compared to the other three types of impacts, these two impacts
exhibit very little variation across respondents. Thus. we will not attempt to estimate
distinct marginal utilities associated with avoided HumanHealth or Oceans& Weather
impacts. Correlations among the other three types of impacts (Agriculture & Water,
Ecosystems, and Equity) cannot be overlooked. especially the ones between ecosystems
and agriculture/water. To accommodate these collinearities, we will rotate through a set
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of three basic models. In each specification, we will "feature" just one of these three
types of impacts.
The key estimation results are reported in Table 14. Models 1-3 differ in the
benefit category \vhich is specifically featured. In Model 4, we run a parsimonious
regression with only those terms that were shown to be persistently significant in
Models 1-3, and we feature Agriculture& water as the expected benefit category. The
variable "program cost" has an estimated coefficient that is negative and significant
across specifications, which indicates that people derive a lower utility from a policy
that involves higher household costs. This is consistent \vith our expectations. The
interaction terms, combining the baseline policy attributes with the position variables,
are the key variables that capture the impacts of question orderings on the estimated
marginal utility associated with different climate policy attributes.
For cost shares and shifters, we estimated a full specification which incorporates
a large set of position-based interaction terms, but many of the estimated coefficients
turn out to be statistically insignificant. Thus, we drop the insignificant interaction terms.
Only those interaction terms \\/ith robustly significant coefficients are included in the
specification reported in Table 14, where the terms indicated \vith the symbol "~" are
the position-based interaction terms which should have zero coefficients if there are no
order effects of the type we allow for in this chapter.
The interaction term "(cost shares paid through decreased investment
return) x (position of industry)'" which bears a coefficient Vvith a negative sign, indicates
that if a person saw "industry" in an earlier position on the list 'vvhen attitudes were
79
elicited about responsibility for the domestic costs of climate change mitigation, then
he/she would have a higher utility when more cost is paid through "decreased
investment returns." The preliminary models in Table A.9 suggest a reason for this
effect. An earlier placement of "industry" on the list seems to make respondents
statistically significantly more likely to "agree" that industry should bear the cost. Cai et
al. (2007) shows if one "agrees" that industry should bear the cost, he/she would have a
higher utility from a policy wherein a higher share of the cost is paid through decreased
investment returns. Thus, the negative sign associated with this term suggests order
effects from earlier tasks can carryover to policy preference in a later choice problem
on the survey.
The coe fficients of other interaction terms, "( cost shares paid through increased
income tax)x (position of tax payers)", "(cost shares paid through increased income
tax) x (position of energy producers)", both \vith negative signs, suggest people would
have a higher utility from a policy that collects higher share of cost through income tax
\vhen "tax payers" or "energy producers" were positioned earlier on the list in the prior
elicitation questions. These results also suggest measurable order effects.
The interaction term "(cost share paid by India and China) x (position ofIndia
and China):' is significant only in the specification which features climate change
impacts on ecosystems. The positive sign on its coefficient again suggests order effects.
This implies that if a person sees a later placement of "India and China", he/she would
derive higher utility from policies that require "India and China" to pay a higher share.
The preliminary models in Table A.I 0 suggest a later placement of"densely populated
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countries" would more likely lead to a response of "agree" with respect to whether these
countries should bear the cost. Our previous work shows that those who "agree" that
these countries should pay the cost would derive a higher utility when higher cost shares
are actually borne by these countries. Therefore, if the ordering of international payors
alters people's subjective attitudes toward the responsibility of these payors in an earlier
survey question, we expect that those who saw a later placement of "densely populated
countries" derive higher utility when greater shares are paid by these countries. Again,
the estimated coefficient is consistent with our expectations.
Some interaction terms involving position variables for cost responsibility bear
coefficients which are statistically significant. However, the ,821 coefficients (on the
interaction terms between 1(Program) indicator and the ordering of global policy
problems do not suggest a statistically significant order effect. Thus, we only report the
estimates involving what should be the most important interaction term (i.e. the one
concerning the position of "preventing climate change") in Models 1-3. The preliminary
model of attitudes has shown that when climate change is placed near the top of the list,
people are more likely to say "climate change is a high priority." When climate policy is
identified as a high priority, people should derive a higher level of utility for policies
involving either complete or a partial mitigation. Therefore, we might expect that when
"climate change" is higher on the list, people are more likely to derive a higher utility
from an active program (eM or PM). Although the coefficient on the relevant
interaction term bears the expected sign, it is not significant even at the 10% level. It is
possible that because these global policy problems were presented at the very beginning
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of the survey, respondents may have recovered il'om any influence of ordering by the
time the policy voting questions were presented near the end of the survey, 30 Since
these terms do not suggest significant order effects. they are dropped from Model 4.
Simulated WTP Bias
Based on the conditionallogit estimates for Model 4 in Table 14, we simulate
WTP amounts for a "complete mitigation" policy to prevent (a.) MODERATE and (b.)
SEVERE anticipated impacts on agriculture&water. for a case where cost is assumed to
be equally distributed among each of the four domestic and international payors. Model
4 in Table 14 suggests that later placement of "industry," .. taxpayers," and "energy
producers" tends to decrease the utility derived from a climate change policy.
Simulations 1 and 2, in each case, differ only in their orderings in the prior attitude
elicitation questions which seem to influence stated preferences in the policy choice
task. In Simulation 1, we assume that "industry," ·'taxpayers." and "energy producers"
appear later on the domestic payor list (positions 6, 4, and 5 respectively). In Simulation
2, "industry," "taxpayers," and "energy producers" are simulated as being placed at the
top of the domestic payor list (positions 3, 1, and 2 respectively). Comparing
simulations 1 and 2, we can see that the implied WTP amount could difTer by nearly
$300 per month.
30 In a more extensive model, we found the coefficient 011 an interaction term combining program and
position of education (complete mitigation x position of education) is sign ificant but positive. This is a
perplexing result that is not consistent with what can be expected frolll our preliminary estimation results.
thus, it does not suggest order effects. Further research could examine the reason why this term is
statistically significant.
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Now consider two scenarios where the respondent expects severe impacts of
climate change on Agriculture&Water. All settings for simulations 3 and 4 are the same
as for simulations 1 and 2, except the expected avoided climate change impacts are set
to "severe." The implied WTP amount could also differ by nearly $300 per month. The
simulations in Table 15 indicate that if researchers strategically arrange prior elicitation
questions in the two different orders, the implied WTP amount could differ by a
significant amount. The arrangement of topics could be an unintentional effect, or it
could be strategic.
Conclusion
This study reveals that there can be statistically significant order effects
stemming from the presentation of prior elicitation questions in a stated preference
survey. We also calculate examples of the potential magnitudes of these order effects on
the simulated distribution of WTP, in the case of complete mitigation policy. The
results suggest the orderings of prior elicitation questions may affect responses to these
questions. Most importantly, arbitrary researcher decisions about the ordering of
information may inadvertently alter people's opinions or attitudes toward some
attributes of the good, and therefore influence their responses to valuation questions. As
an example. if researchers arrange prior elicitation questions differently in two
questionnaires. the simulated WTP amounts for complete pre\'ention of climate change
impacts could differ by nearly $300 per month in our sample.
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This chapter emphasizes the significance of question ordering in prior elicitation
questions, and it supports our contention that future stated preference survey research
should randomize the information presented in each section of the questionnaire to
avoid potential ordering effects to the fullest extent possible. The use of random
orderings will also permit the researcher to assess the potential extent of any possible
order effects.
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for responses and positions to preliminary and voting
decisions
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Responses Positions in ordering
Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev.
H'hat are your personal relative priorities
{or each o!the{ol!owing world issues?
climate change
poverty
education
cnme
endangered species
nuclear weapon
food
health
race
env ironment
wars
Responsibility/or costs:
Domestic payment vehicles
1flli.gb}
0.453
0.668
0.817
0.68l
0.549
0.55]
0.478
0.707
0.547
0.747
0.622
~
0.308
0.151
0.071
0.133
0.229
0.254
0.277
0.112
0.228
0.090
0.186
Range fi'olll I to 1I
6.055 3.169
5.984 3.168
5961 3.193
6087 3.187
6.028 3.152
5.907 3.164
6.052 3.166
6.019 3.174
5.988 3.152
5.928 3.182
5.991 3.082
Consumer
Industry
Taxpayers
Energy Users
Energy Producers
Government
International payment vehicles
Proportional to their contribution
Industrialized countries
US and its major trade partners
Developing countries
Densely populated
countries, like India and China
Countries offormer Soviet Union
Smaller developing countries
Voting decision
Vote for BAU
Vote for PM
Vote for CM
I(agree) I(disagree) Range from I to 6
0.688 0.166 3.529 1.729
0.849 0.078 3.539 1.720
0.432 0.078 3.510 1.685
0.810 0.087 3.545 1.702
0.863 0.064 3.496 1.722
0.799 0.010 2.929 1.393
I(agree) J(d isagree) Range fi'orn 1 to 7
0.881 0.064 4.047 1.980
0.582 0.264 3.976 2.006
0.747 0.131 4.035 2.011
0.763 0.133 3.869 2.004
0.597 0.233 4.016 2.016
0.431 0.318 3.483 1.667
0.278 0.512 4.102 2.016
~~
0.275
0.219
0.506
Table 14. Estimations explaining the inf1uence of order effect on WTP; "~" denotes a position-biased interaction term.
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Featured Impacts: Featured Impacts: Featured Impacts: Parsimonious Model
X=Ecosystems X=Equity, Fairness X=Agriculture, Water X=Agriculture, Water
Cost, cost shares, shifters: !
Program cost -0.145 -0.149 -0.145 -0.144
(4.38)*** (4.53)*** (4.41 )*** (4.38)***
Decreased investment returns (in 'OOs) 0.767 0.728 0.785 0.888
(1.53) (1.46) (1.58) (1.89)*
: ~ .. *position of "industry" -0.176 -0.170 -0.185 -0.181
(1.74)* (1.70)* (1.85)* (1.81)*
Increased income taxes (in 'OOs) 1.245 1.456 1.368 1.449
(1.90)* (223)** (2.09)** (2.29)**
: ~ .. *position of "taxpayers" -0.241 -0.242 -0.238 -0.237
(2.32)** (233)** (2.30)** (229)**
: ~ ... *position of"energy producers" : -0.202 -0.235 -0.223 -0.216
(200)** (2.34)** (2.22)** (2.15)**
Increased energy taxes (in 'OOs) -0.149 -0.182 -0,214
(0.46) (0.56) (0.66)
US and Japan (in 'OOs) 0.345 0.360 0.315
(1.22) (1.28) (1.12)
India and China (in 'OOs) -0.611 0.048 0.0] 3
(1.35) (0.17) (0.05)
~ .*position of "India and China" : 0.147
( 1.68)*
Benefits (avoided impacts), informedness:
I (moderateL X'] (baseline)
I(severe) X" (baseline)
0.113
(0.70)
0.943
(5.66)***
0.241
(2.18)**
0.976
(6.62)***
0.319
(2.39)**
0.890
(5.76)***
0.324
(2.43)* *
0.890
(5.77)***
00
IJ1
Table 14, (Continued)
Elicitation Formats:
Partial mitigation
~ ,*position of "climate change"
Complete mitigation
2,189 2,148 2,210
(7,05)*** (6,98)*** (7,17)***
-0,026 -0,020 -0,027
(0,92) (0,70) (0,97)
0,681 0,760 0,702
2,034
(1 1,04)***
0,533
0,613
(3,95)***
4389
(2.75)***(2.42)**
-0,026
( I .44)
0,616
(3.96)***
4389
,*position of "climate change"
'" * I (saw partial mitigation alternative)
(2,24)** (2,71)***
-0,025 : -0,020
(1.37) : (1.13)
0,567 : 0,614
(3,62)*** : (3,94)***
Observations 4389 : 4389
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses ***significant at 10%;** significant at 5%: *** significant at 1%
a Ratings of climate change impacts are grouped for this analysis, I(Severe) implies a substantial negative impact; I(moderate) implies a moderate
negative impact; the om itted categOlY is interpreted as neutral or positive impact
~
00
0\
Table 15. Simulated WTP (median. 5'11, 95'11 percentiles) for complete mitigation. based on 1000 random draws from the asymptotically normal joint
distribution of the parameter estimates based on Model 4-the parsimonious speci fication for impacts on Agriculture (median monthly income in
sample = $5208)
(a.) Moderate Impact on Agriculture
Simulation I Simulation 2
(b.) Severe Impact on Agriculture
Simulation 3 Simulation 4
Cost. cost shares. shifters:
Decreased investment returns (in 'OOs) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
~ .*position of "industry" 6 3 6 "
-'
Increased income taxes (in '(JOs) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
~ .*position of ·'taxpayers" 4 I -+ I
~ .. *position of "energy producers" :=; :2 :=; 2
lncreased energy taxes (i n •OOs) N/A N/A N/A N/A
US and Japan (in 'OOs) N/A N/A N/A N;A
Ind ia and Ch ina (in' OOs) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Benefits (avoided impacts)
I(moderate) 1 I 0 0
I(severe) 0 0 I ]
EI icitation Format
Partial mitigation 0 0 0 0
Complete mitigation I I 1 I
... * I(saw partial mitigation) 0 0 0 0
Willingness to pay (WTP) $365 $639 $689 $964
[259, 502] [506, 888] [532,993] [748, 1395]
00
-.....)
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APPENDIX
VARIABLES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Table A. ]. Variable definition
Variable Name
Key Polic}' Generosity Measurements
Inpatient
Outpatient
Education Attachment
No school
Primary
Low middle
Upper middle
College
Demographic Variables
Household income
Male
Urban
Age
Occupation
Senior professional
Junior professional
Administrator
Staff
Farmer
Skilled worker
Non-skilled worker
Employer
State
Large collective
Private
Year Dummies
Year1993
Year1997
Definition
Percentage of reimbursement for inpatient care
Percentage of reimbursement for outpatient care
=1 ifdid not attend any school education
=1 if got some primary education
=1 if attended junior high school
=1 if attended high school
=1 if has college education
Household income
=1 if the person is male
= I if the observation is urban
Age of the individual
=1 if senior professional
= I if junior professional
=1 if is administrator
=1 if office staff
=1 iffarmer
=1 ifskilled worker
=1 if non-skilled worker
=1 if works for state-owned company
=1 if works for large collective company
=1 if works for private company
=1 if year =1993
=1 if year =1997
--------------
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Table A.2 Heckman selectivity correction model controlling for two types of selection
at the same time using Limdep
Heckman selection model
year1997
publicinsured
publicinsured x year 1997
urban
education
household income
(in '00000 Yuan)
age
constant
Sick level included
Occupation &enterprises
included
Interaction terms included
Province dummy variable
Observations
P-value of t-test for p =0
P-value of t-test for
Lambda-A
P-value of t-test for
Lambda-B
yes
yes
no
yes
1043
0.242
0.529
20.91 -0.978
(-1.18) (-1.35)
0.301 0.009
(-0.62) (-2.18)**
-0.068 0.009
(-0.27) (-0.90)
6.224 -0.688
(-0.07) (-3.18)***
1.447 1.103
(-0.80) (5JJ3)***
no no
yes yes
no yes
yes yes
16573 16573
0.999
Absolute value ofz statistics in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
a Selection 1 controls for systematic selections into the sample of·'being recently sick."
b Selection 2 controls for systematic selections into the sample of the treatment and control groups (i.e.
the publicly insured and uninsured groups).
Tab]e A.3 - Distributions of climate change impact ratings; five types of impacts. absolute fi-equency and percent; universal sample
Posterior
agriculture human oceans &
rating (or & water ecosystem s health weather equity
rating interval impacts impacts impacts impacts impacts
midpoint)
Descriptor Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent· Freq. Percent : Freq. Percent
extremely harmed -4 ]44 6.7 26] 12.1 1437 66.7 1,453 67.5 104 4.8
-3.5 29 1.4 48 2.2 341 15.8 3]0 \4.4 18 0.8
-3 319 14.8 468 21.7 305 \4.2 3]0 14.4 216 10.0
-2.5 63 2.9 1] 7 5.4 43 2.0 50 ) ~ 66 3.1_.J
-2 593 275 535 24.8 22 1.0 21 1.0 410 ]9.0
-1.5 145 6.7 120 5.6 3 0.1 6 0.3 ] 14 5.3
-I 422 19.6 294 13.7 3 0.1 428 ]9.9
-0.5 80 3.7 58 2.7 1 0.1 124 5.8
unaffected a 176 8.2 112 5.2 2 01 I 0.1 432 20.1
0.5 18 0.8 12 0.6 44 2.0
I 82 3.8 52 2.4 102 4.7
1.5 13 0.6 5 0.2 27 1.3
2 44 2.0 36 1.7 46 21
2.5 \ 0.1 4 0.2 5 02
3 18 0.8 22 1.0 13 0.6
0 I 0.1
extremely impl'Oveci 4 7 03 9 0.4 5 0.2
Total 2,] 54 100.0 2,154 100.0 2,154 100.0 2.154 100.0 2,154 100.0
\0
o
Table A.4 Pairwise correlations in climate change impact ratings (obs=2154)
agriculture human oceans &
equity& water ecosystems health weather
impacts impacts impacts impacts impacts
agriculture & water impacts 1.0000
ecosystems impacts 0.7017 1,0000
human health impacts 0.0803 0.0919 1.0000
oceans & weather impacts 0.1262 0.1282 0.5787 1.0000
equity impacts 0.4497 0.4493 0.0852 0.0621 1.0000
\0


Table A.5 (Continued)
Elicitation fomlats;
Partial mitigation (alt-spec.
constant)
~
~
~
... * I(Not W01TiedL X
.. * I(high informed)
... * 1(low in formed)
(2.02)**
0.286
(1.39)
2.015
-0.676
(4.41)***
-0.159
(0.R5)
1.939
(1.89)*
0744
(3.23)* **
-0.399
-0.446 -0 159
(2.45)** (2.65)*** (OS9)
-0.243 0.046 -0.007
(1.26) (022) (0.(l3)
2.125 2.2R0 1.%3 2.251
(097)
O.RSO
(6.18)* **
2.05R
-0.565
(3.49)***
-0.043
(0.21 )
I.S46
-0.253
(1.4 7)
-0.133
(O.M)
204R
~ ... * I(Clil11iJte iJ high priority)
~ ... * I(Climatealowpriority)
~ * I(Belongs to enviro.
group/s»)
Complete mitigation (alt-spec.
constant)
.. * 1(Saw Partial Mitigation
alternative)
(4.10)***
0.453
(092)
0.606
(3.97)***
0.477
(0.97)
0.609
(3.27)*" (4.56)*** (400)*** (3.44)* ** (4.16)***
-0.222 -0.244
(OS3) (0.00)
0.325 0.207
(1.24 ) ( 112)
0.203 0.241
(OR8) ( J.()3)
0.727 0.657 0.49R 0.844 0.802
(126) (1.30) (1.00) ( 1.44) (1.64 )
0.578 0.511 0540 0.538 0.584
(3.70)***
0.477
(099)
0.606
(3.15)***
-0.241
(0.90)
0.320
( 122)
0.235
( 1(1)
0.751
(1.33)
0581
~ ... * I(Climate a high priority)
~ .* I(Climate a low priority)
~ .* I(Belongs to enviro. group/s)
Observations
(3.76)*** (3.78)*** (3.45)*** (3.12)*** (3.37)*** (3.IS)*** (3.60)*** (3.75)"* (3.46)***
0.592 0.555 0.626
(3.5 1)*** (326)*** (3.71 )* ..
-0.658 -O.66() -0.623
(3.95)**' (3.99)*** (3.73)***
0.532 0.400 0.523
(3.33)*** (3.05)*** (3.28)***
,~,- 4235 4235 4203: 4235 4235 4203: 4235 4235 4203:
'Ratings of climate change impacts are grouped for this analysis 1(Severe) implies a substantial negative impact: -4:::; rating < -2: 1(moderate) implies a modaate
negative impact: -2:::; rating < 0: the omitted category is 0:::; rating:::; +4 (interpreted as neutral or positive impact)
\D
~
Table A.6. Extensive form of conditional log it choice models using attitudes characterization "disagrees" (versus omitted category consisting of
"agree" or "'neutral"); "~" denotes an attitude-based construct validity interaction term.
, ;\gt'iculture. \V,lIer Ecosystems impacts Equity, Fairness
: il\1p"lcts onl) only impacts onl)
(Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (2a) (2b) Pc) (3,1) (3b) (3c):
Cost, cost shares, shifters:
Program cost
nomeslie validill' assessmenl vurtuhles
lilCl'eased energy taxes (in 'OOs)
~ .* 1(Disagree )_Energyusers
~ .... [(DisagreeLT,npayers
~ ... * I (Disagree)J~nergyProdueers
Increased income taxes (in 'OOs)
~ .'* lWisagreeLraxpayers
Decreased investment rC'lurns (in 'OOs)
~ ... * I (Disagree)_lndustry
Increased consumer price
~ .. " 1(Disagree)_consul11ers
fnlernalional validily assessmenl vuriah/es
India and China (in 'O(J:;)
~ '" * I (Disagree)_IndiaChina
Other del'eloping countries (ill 'OOs)
~ ... * I(Disagrec)_DevelopingCol\lllries
~ .. " 1(DisagreeLSmallerDel'eloping
US and Japan (in 'OOs)
~ .'* I(Disagree)_lISJapan
-0.150
(4.3g)" **
-1. 009
(153 )
-O.93()
(224)**
-(Ug5
(076)
-0.379
(094)
-1054
( 1.60)
-1.006
(202)* *
-0.658
( IA9)
0255
(0.50)
-0.09 I
(0.36 )
-1.343
(2.60)** *
-0. I SO
(-.1.39)***
-0.85 I
( 1.28)
-0.971
(2.31 )**
-0. (,«1
(087)
-0.3 67
(0.9 I)
- Un5
(1S7)
-0.9 \9
( 1.85)*
-ONJ7
( 1.59)
0.185
(036)
-0.19
(027)
-1.27
(2A5)* *
-0.158
(443)"**
-0.752
( 110)
-OC)48
(220)* *
-0348
(043)
-0.32
(077)
-1.063
( 1.55)
-0.745
(J AS)
-0765
(1.681'
O. J 54
(029)
-0.154
(010)
-1.038
(1.94)*
-0.147
(4.21 )***
-1.242
( 185)*
-0.952
(2.24 )**
-0.346
(045)
-0.425
( 1(4)
-1147
(U2)*
-0.678
(US)
-0.738
(1.64)
0.163
(03 I)
-0047
(0.47)
-1.07(,
(203)* *
-1l.151
(4.37 J* **
-0.875
( IA(,)
-1l.917
(2.34)**
-0.906
(071 )
-0.369
( 115)
-1l.997
( 1.53)
-0.94
(UO)*
-0.656
( 1.70)*
0.232
(0.27)
-0.139
(0.26)
-1.266
(1.98)**
-0.159
(4.44 )***
-0.695
(121 )
-0 9 I3
(2.22)* *
-0.635
(0.40)
-0.31
(096)
-1.00 I
( 1.47)
-0.784
( 1.34)
-0.749
(1.79)*
o 184
(0.26)
-0.111
(0. J 8)
-I.()35
(1.64 )
-0.154
(4.47)***
-1.071
( 1,(13)
-0.878
(2 OX)"
-0.X87
( I. 18)
-0.419
(104 )
-0.915
( 1.37)
-0.854
(1.71 )*
-0.737
(1.67)*
0178
(034 )
-0.039
(0.31 )
-1.249
(238)**
-0.15 I
(4.41 )**"
-0.976
(U3)
-0.99
(2.19)**
-0.546
( 120)
-0.467
(1l.92)
- J.()26
(1.51 )
-O.X5
( 1.90)*
-0.756
( ISO)
() 14
(0.45 )
-0.151
(0.33)
-I03()
(245)**
-0. 161
(451)***
-0832
( 1.(3)
-O.96b
(2. I 1)**
-(U22
(0.80)
-0402
((US)
-1.1l1 I
(147)
-0 N) 1
(153)
-0822
( 1(5)*
0.14
(0.34)
-0.109
(0.14)
-0.886
(1.95)*
'-0
IJ)

Table A.6 (Continued)
Observations
~ .* I(Clim<JLe a low rl'iority)
~ .* I(Climme a low priority)
~ .. '* I(Climiltc a high priorit))
( 1.47)
-0.132
(063)
(3.47)***
-0027
(0.13)
( 1.(7)
-0005
(0.02)
(2.91)***
0.054
(0.26)
(2.53)**
-0.217
( 1.13)
2.018 2.120 2.050 2.114 2.271 2.046 2.022
(3.54)*** (5.55)*** (5.38)*** (3'(,9)**' (5.95)*** (5.42)*** (35(,)***
0(,14 0.588 0.610
(236)** (224)** (2.34)**
0.118 I 0.060 0.062
\030) (022) (0.23)
11176 0213 0205
(076) (002) (()8'l)
[)j3·j 061'! 055 I 0.627 Ol)56 11.(,(,2 0.654
(10')) (156) (1.30) (1.25) (2501" (\76)* (13(,)
IIj8[) 0.512 [)j48 O.53b IIj88 O.(,O~ 11.58 I
D4(»)'*" (3.1.')**' (3.37)*** (.,.17)*** 13.(4)**" {.'.75)*'* (3.4(,)***
[).844 08118 0.X811
15.(3)*** (4.70)*** (5.2(,1'**
-11376 -(U90 -0.342
(223)** (230)** (2.03)**
0518 0.473 Ojll.1
(.,.27)*** (2.96)'** (3.18)**"
o55'!
(1.+5 )
lI.b I,
(.;glll""'·
2.049
(5411***
(4.57)***
-0.123
(0.65)
4235 4235 4203 4235 4235 4203 4235 4235 4203
0(,18
( 1.(1)
0,(,12
(.'.XO)'" .'
2.210
(5.81 )***
.* 1(lo\\' informed)
('omrlctc mitigat10n (all-Srcc. COllstal1l)
.* IISilll l'ilrlial rVIitigallol1 "Itcm"ti,c')
~ .. '* I(Bclongs to cllviro. group/s)
~ .. '* 1(Climate a high rriority)
~ .. '* I(Bclongstoenviro.grour/s ))
Elicitation formats:
f'artialmitigalion (all-spec. constant)
~
a Ratings of cI imate change impacts are groured for th is analysis I(Severe) impl ies a suhstantial negative impact: -4 :S; rating < -2 . 1(moderate) imrl ies a
moderate negative impact: -2:s; rating < 0: the omitted category is O:S; rating :S; +4 (interpreted as neutral or positive impact)
'-0
-......l
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Table A. 7. Descriptive statistics for individual characteristics
Variables Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Demographic information
Family income (in levels)* 0 6 3.854 1.735
Money qualified to borrow (in levels)** 0 6 2.733 1.172
Female 0 I 0.496 0.500
Age in years 18 69 22.30 I 5.474
EdlicOlion
Yeas of college study completed 0 6 2.712 1.674
Major in physics science 0 1 0.106 0.307
Major in life science 0 I 0.140 0.347
Major in social science 0 I 0.301 0.459
Major in art 0 I 0.082 0.275
Major in English 0 I 0.079 0.269
Major in business 0 I 0.349 0.477
KnOlvledge about Environment & Economics
Have taken class on climate change 0 I 0.517 0.500
Have taken courses on econom ics 0 I 0.880 0.325
# of participating environment groups 0 6 0.399 0.832
Number right of nine climate quiz questions 0 9 5.274 1.760
TYork status
Work status=work full-time 0 0.068 0.251
Work status=work part-time 0 0.363 0.481
Work status=student 0 0.928 0.258
Work status=non-paid work 0 0.041 0.199
Work status=retired 0 0.003 0.053
Work statlls=chi Idcare!eldercare provider 0 0.013 0.115
Other in/i.n-mation
] 10.7
Max im um time (seconds) spent on Socia module 0.37 3 3.291 4.185
# of lottery tickets bought per year 0 6 1.655 1.052
Note: * ramil) annual income were described in levels from a to 6. where the income brackets were: 0« $10.000): 1
('j; I0.000 - $20.0(0): 2 ( $20.000- $30.(00): 3 ($30.000 - $50.(00): 4 ( $50.000 - $75,(00): 5 ($75.000 - $100.000): 6
(> $100.(00)
** The ,111101l1lt of money qualilied to borrow was described in levels II'om 0 to 6, where the levels \\ere interpreted as:
0($0): 1($100) 2 ($ 1.000): 3 ($10.000): 4 ($50.000): 5 ($100.000): 6 (>$100.000).
Table A.8. First stage probit estimation (evidence of ordering effect in questions
concerning climate change priority).
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Position:
( I=first, ... ,II =Iast)
prevent ing cIimate change
reducing povelty
improving education
reducing violent crime
protecting endangered species
reducing nuclear threats
improving food safety
improving health
race/ethnic tension
cleaning up environment
Preventing warsb
I(Climate change is high priority)
coefficient" t-stats
-0.027 (3.03)***
-0.0 14 ( 1.63)
-0.0 17 (1.89)*
-0.006 (0.74)
-0.014 ( 1.60)
-0.001 (0.13)
-0.027 (3.13 )***
-0.008 (0.96)
-0.00 1 (0.07)
-0.006 (0.67)
Constant
Individual characteristics includedc
-0.114
yes
(0.31 )
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
***significant at 10%; ** significant at 50.'0; *** significant at 1%
a All these coefficients are negative. Those significant ones indicate that their positions (relative to the
position of"preventing wars") do not alter responses. However, those significant ones suggest their
relative positions do matter, and if they are placed earlier than "preventing wars," respondents are more
likely to say climate change is a high priority.
b "Preventing wars" is the omitted category.
C These include all variables in Table A.I (Full results are available from the authors)
Table A.9. First stage probit estimation (evidence ofOl'dering effect in questions concerning which domestic payors should bear the mitigation costs of
climate change); "government" is the omitted category.
Position of: 1(agree) responsibility of:
A B C 0 E F
A 0.012 -0.038 -0.013 0.022 -0.039 0.017
(0.78) (2.05)** (0.89) ( 1.27) (2.05)** (0.99)
B 0.022 -0.035 -0.G3 I 0.017 0.004 0.004
(1.3 7) (1.84)* (1.99)** (0.95) (0.21 ) (0.24)
C -0.015 -0.016 -0.060 -0.027 -0.008 -0.009
(0.91 ) (0.83) (3.95)*** (1.53 ) (045) (0.51 )
0 0.019 0.000 0019 -0.012 -0.014 0.023
( \.23) (0.03) ( \.26) (0.66) (0.74 ) (1.30)
E 0.017 0.029 -0.028 0.009 -0.017 0.022
( 108) ( 160) (1.91)* (()'sO) (0.92) ( 1.29)
Constant -0.402 0.665 0.485 -0.290 0.714 1.431
(1.46) (2.06 )** ( 1.84)* (0.95) (2.20)** (481 )***
Individual yes yes yes yes yes yes
characteristics
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses ***significal1t at 10%:** significant at 5%: *** significal1t at 1%
Note: A. consumer
B. industry
C. taxpayers
D. energy users
E. energy producers
F. govemment
o
o
Table A.l O. First stage probit estimation (evidence of ordering effect in questions concerning which international country groups should bear the
mitigation costs of climate change); "smaller developing countries" is the omitted category.
Position of: 1(agree) responsibility of:
G
G H I J
-0.048 0086 0.068 0.046
(2.62)*** (6.18)*** (4.46)*** (3.05)***
K
0.034
(2.43)**
L
0.082
(5.91 )***
M
0.06\
(4.18)***
0.005 -0.008 0.072 0.004 0.023
(0.30) (0.60) (4.78)**"; (029) ( 167)*
-0.029 0.031 0.028 0.0 [7 -0.002
(161 ) (2.29)** (I. 90) * ( 115) (0.13 )
0045 0.033 -0009 0.045 -0.005
(253 )** (2.43 )** (064 ) (3.05)*'''' (0.38)
-0.031 0.005 0.020 0.042 0.047
( 1.67)* (0.34) (1.34 ) (277)*** (3.39)"*"
0.008 -0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.031
(0.40) (0.10) (0.62) (0.13) (2.03)**
0.834 -0.088 -0.361 0.332 0.012
(2.09)** (0.29) ( 1.08) ( 1.00) (0.04 )
H
J
K
L
Constant
Individual
characteristics
yes yes yes yes yes
0.069 -0.005
(S,(l3 )*** (034)
-()036 -0 000
(2.63)*** (003)
()() 18 -()OI2
( 1.27) (OS3)
0.032 0.025
(2.29)** (1.72)*
0.018 -0025
(1.16) ( I .53)
-1272 -0.380
(4.08)*** ( 1I8)
yes yes
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses ***significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at I'Vo
Note: G. countries in proportion to their contribution to the problem
H. industrialized countries
I. US and its major trade pm1ners
J. developing countries
K. densely populated countries, like India and China
L. countries of fonner Soviet Union
M. smaller developing countries
o
Table A.I I Summary of our previous findings: consistency between attitudes and policy choices
Individuals whose attitude is ...
Agree industry paying the mitigation cost
Agree energy users paying the mitigation cost
Agree tax payer paying the mitigation cost
Agree India and China paying the cost
Agree US and Japan paying the cost
Climate change is high priority
would convey a higher utility from a policy that ...
Higher cost share paid through decreased investment return
Higher cost share paid through energy tax
Higher cost share paid through income tax
Higher cost share paid through India and China
Higher cost share paid through US and Japan
Complete mitigation
o
N
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